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DEMOCRATIC NORMS AND
GOVERNANCE EXPERIMENTALISM IN
WORKER CENTERS
SAMEER M. ASHAR* AND CATHERINE L. FISK**
I
INTRODUCTION
The United States is on the cusp of major change in workplace governance.
Scholarship on contemporary labor law notes the decline of unionism in its
twentieth century form and the rise of new forms of worker organization.1
Conceptualizations of a “new labor law” observe that worker activism is
channeled through social movement organizations in addition to, in coalition
with, or in lieu of unions.2 This is true in the Fight for 15 campaign that has had a
significant nationwide impact on law and legal institutions regulating low-wage
work,3 in challenges to worker exploitation in both labor and product supply
chains,4 in the One Fair Wage campaign to eliminate the subminimum wage for
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1. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Sanchez Ocasio & Leo Gertner, Fighting for the Common Good: How
Low-Wage Workers’ Identities Are Shaping Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. F. 503 (2017).
2. Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2016) (describing the “new labor law”).
3. FIGHT FOR $15, https://fightfor15.org [https://perma.cc/5SZT-S8CS](last visited April 3, 2019);
DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR $15: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA (2016); David
Madland, Wage Boards for American Workers: Industry-Level Collective Bargaining for All Workers,
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 9, 2018); NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINIMUM
WAGE FACT SHEET, https://www.labor.ny.gov/formsdocs/factsheets/pdfs/p716.pdf (last visited June 6,
2019); see generally Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019) (discussing the history of the use of wage
boards under the federal wage-hour law).
4. Jennifer Gordon, Regulating the Human Supply Chain, 102 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2017); Galit A.
Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419 (2015); FAIR FOOD PROGRAM,
www.fairfoodprogram.org [https://perma.cc/YY2U-LKMS] (last visited April 3, 2019); Jennifer Gordon,
The Problem with Corporate Social Responsibility, WORKER-DRIVEN SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
NETWORK (last visited April 3, 2019), https://wsr-network.org/resource/the-problem-with-corporatesocial-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/RAC2-76KR].
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tipped employees,5 in organizing among domestic and home care workers,6 in the
ongoing efforts to provide some form of worker representation in platform-based
and gig economy work,7 and in regional efforts to transform low-wage labor
markets.8 On the other side, business groups seek to eliminate majority rule
unionism entirely9 and to have a court declare that collective action by workers
violates federal antitrust law; in these litigations, business groups insist that labor
unions coerce members and nonmembers alike and are oligarchic cartels that do
not reflect worker interests.10 One way or another, the institutions and the law
regulating collective action by workers will transform over the next five to ten
years into something substantially different from the institutions and law of the
past century.
In this period of ferment, the governance of social movement organizations
gains new salience. At the most general level, the legitimacy and efficacy of social
movement activism aimed at legal change may depend on whether social
movement organizations are broadly representative of those on whose behalf
they speak. Moreover, to the extent that labor law reforms should be aimed at
counteracting autocracy at work, as philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has
argued,11 it matters that the institutional frameworks created to promote
democracy in civil society provide for accountable representation of workers.
Also, at a general level, the burgeoning literature on law and social movements
has yet to fully incorporate an account of the internal governance of social
movement organizations. Moreover, understanding the prospects for workplace
5. SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING (2016); Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. F. 22 (2018); Suzanne Specker,
“Hun, I Want You for Dessert”: Why Eliminating the Sub-Minimum Wage for Restaurant Servers Will
Empower Women, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 335 (2015); RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTERS
UNITED, rocunited.org (last visited April 3, 2019); ONE FAIR WAGE, onefairwage.com
[https://perma.cc/DX3K-A3LQ](last visited April 3, 2019).
6. Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1390 (2008).
7. See generally, Symposium: Law and the Disruptive Workplace, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F.; V. B.
Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on
Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739; Sanjukta Paul, Uber as For Profit Hiring Hall, 38
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 233 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy:
Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479 (2016).
8. See, e.g., SCOTT CUMMINGS, BLUE AND GREEN: THE DRIVE FOR JUSTICE AT AMERICA’S
PORT (2018) (a regional campaign to transform trucking in Southern California).
9. That is, they seek to have the Court overrule Minn. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271 (1984). Thus far, the Supreme Court has denied review in cases that presented the opportunity to
overrule Knight. See Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Organization, 2018 WL 4654751 (D. Minn. 2018) (rejecting
First Amendment challenge to, and denying preliminary injunction against enforcement of Minnesota
public sector labor law providing that union is the exclusive representative of faculty) (same), aff’d, (8th
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, (Apr. 29, 2019). See also Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018), cert.
denied, 2019 WL 2078110 (May 13, 2019).
10. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Seattle
ordinance allowing collective bargaining by independent contractor for-hire drivers is not immune from
antitrust scrutiny under state action immunity).
11. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND
WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) (Princeton University Press, 2017).
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democracy requires understanding the organizations that represent workers in
and outside the workplace.
The literatures on law and social movements and labor law reform invite
empirical study of whether or how worker formations promote worker voice and
autonomy; this paper reports findings of interviews we conducted as a
preliminary foray into such a study. Worker centers, the organizations that we
study in this article, rose to fill gaps created as a result of increasing economic
and social inequality and declining union density in the United States.12 In
particular, our research seeks answers to five questions:
1. Is there a relationship between democratic norms in social movement
organizations and the types of campaigns that they wage?
2. Why do organizations created to empower poor and marginalized
people embrace democracy? Why have some, at times, slid toward
oligarchy? Is centralization and concentration of power inevitable in
social movement organizations?
3. Are governance innovations in social movement organizations
scalable?
4. To what extent is the pursuit of democracy at the workplace and in
civil society organizations envisioned as being crucial to the prospects
for social and political democracy?13
5. How do legal regulation and funding models affect democratic norms
in social movement organizations?
Based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with a mix of lawyers,
executive directors, and organizers deeply involved in a variety of worker centers
and workers’ social movement organizations nationwide,14 we find these
organizations are pluralistic in terms of their commitment to, and modes of
incorporating, worker voice and worker leadership. The variations among
organizations correlate with the economic and political power of employers in
the sector, the origins and development of an affiliate structure of the worker
organization, turnover among workers, the organizational resources and capacity
of the worker organization, choices made by organization leaders about the
501(c)(3) structure, the advocacy modes of the organization, and characteristics
of the workers and the organizational leadership.
12. On worker centers: JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE
EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS (2005); Peter Kwong,
Chinese Staff and Workers Association: A Model for Organizing in the Changing Economy?, 25 SOCIAL
POLICY 30 (1994); MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN
WORKERS TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY (2001); BIJU MATTHEW, TAXI! CABS AND CAPITALISM
IN NEW YORK CITY (2005); RINKU SEN, STIR IT UP: LESSONS IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZING AND
ADVOCACY (2003); RINKU SEN & FEKKAK MAMDOUH, THE ACCIDENTAL AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2008); VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS’ UNIONS:
REBUILDING LABOR FROM BELOW 129–57 (2005).
13. ANDERSON, supra note 11; JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (Harvard
University Press, 2015); Cynthia Estlund, Rethinking Autocracy at Work, 131 HARV. L. REV. 795 (2018);
Aziz Z. Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018).
14. We discuss our empirical methods in Part III.A., infra.
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We find a major commonality among all worker centers studied: social
movement organizations of workers pursue internal democracy because the
leadership deems it both instrumentally and intrinsically beneficial to the cause
of improving working conditions and creating a more equitable political
economy. Organizational democracy is time-consuming, but if a campaign can
leverage and be shaped by workers’ organic leadership and community
relationships, the result could be more powerful than even a well-designed
corporate campaign.
The structure of this article is as follows. Part II frames the research questions
by exploring the relevant literatures on social movement organizations and
worker organizations. Part III describes our research methods and sets out our
analysis of the content of the interviews. Part IV reflects on the continuities and
discontinuities between workers centers and unions in light of our findings. Part
V considers five additional implications of our findings and concludes.
II
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS,
LABOR UNIONS, AND NONPROFITS
The analysis we draw from our interviews with worker center leaders
contributes to at least three different strands of research on the governance of
civil society groups such as social movement organizations, labor unions, and
nonprofits. At the most general level, the literatures—in law, sociology, political
science, and history, among other disciplines—describe and theorize about the
structure and governance of various nonprofit organizations that organize and
advocate for workers and other groups.
The literature on social movement organizations has emphasized the
possibility of participatory democracy in social movements, asking whether broad
participation is feasible in a large organization or in an organization that seeks to
achieve political change in the face of powerful opposition.15 A related question
in the law and social movements literature focuses on the relationship between
social movement structures and their capacity to achieve social change.16 In our
interviews, we sought to learn leaders’ views on the relationship between
democratic structure, worker development, and efficacy in achieving social
change.
Another debate, one especially dominant in the labor law and labor studies
literature, focuses on union democracy—what used to be called top-down and
bottom-up organizing—and the challenges for unions of being both internally
democratic and powerful, especially when dealing with large corporate
opponents in organizing workers and in bargaining.17 In our interviews, we sought
15. See, e.g., FRANCESCA POLLETTA, FREEDOM IS AN ENDLESS MEETING: DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (University of Chicago, 2002).
16. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64
UCLA L. Rev. 1554 (2017);
17. See, e.g., FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY
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to learn what worker centers are doing to match their governance structure with
their organizing, worker development, and social change goals.
A third debate, mainly in the law of nonprofit organizations but also in labor
law, focuses on accountability of the leadership to the membership or intended
beneficiaries of the organization’s activity.18 By default, nonprofit organizations
follow the board of directors and staff director model of the 501(c)(3)
organization and have relied predominantly on foundation grants rather than
member dues for funding. Our interviews explore the question of whether the
501(c)(3) organization and grant-based funding model lead to the accountability
issues that have been explored in the literature on nonprofits and how these
organizations envision accountability to workers.
A. The Possibility of Participatory Democracy in Social Movement
Organizations
The study of social movement organizations, or SMOs, is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Sociologists McCarthy and Zald, who have driven research in a
series of influential articles in the field, define an SMO as “a complex, or formal,
organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement
or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.”19 McCarthy and
Zald recount a prehistory of “classical” SMOs driven by base mobilization, which
gave way in the 1960s and 1970s to “professionalized” SMOs.20 Unlike the
classical SMOs started and sustained by “beneficiary” constituents, under
“resource mobilization” theory the professionalized SMOs were started by
“entrepreneurs,” led by paid leaders, and funded largely by “conscience”
constituents driven by a commitment to movement goals rather than being
directly affected themselves by the causes of social grievance.21 Resource
mobilization theory spawned a critical literature, most prominently in sociology
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL (New York: Vintage, 1977); Jane McAlevey, The Crisis of New Labor
and Alinsky’s Legacy: Revisting the Role of the Organize Grassroots Leaders in Building Powerful
Organizations and Movements, 43 POL. & SOC. 415 (2015); Kim Voss, Same as it Ever Was? New Labor,
the CIO Organizing Model, and the Future of American Unions, 43 POL. & SOC. 453 (2015); Kim Voss &
Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor
Movement, 106 AM. J. SOC. 303 (2000).
18. On nonprofits: See, e.g., Melanie DiPietro, Duty of Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for
Modern Nonprofit Governance Accountability, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 99 (2007); Renee A. Irvin, State
Regulation of Nonprofit Organizations: Accountability Regardless of Outcome, 34 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 161 (2005); Rosario Laratta, Advocacy, Accountability, and Ethical Climate in
Nonprofit Organizations, 10 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 17 (2012); Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil
Society: The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 OR. L. REV. 829 (2003). On labor: See,
e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, MARTIN A. TROW & JAMES COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY: THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION (1956); Guy Mundlak,
Workplace-Democracy: Reclaiming the Effort to Foster Public and Private Isomorphism, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 159 (2014).
19. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1218 (1977).
20. Id. at 1216–17.
21. Suzanne Staggenborg, The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the ProChoice Movement, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 585, 585 (1988).
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by scholars who argued that professionalized SMOs betrayed their base by
fostering social control by founders, leaders, and funders.22 Piven and Cloward,
drawing on their study of the welfare rights movement, contended that
professionalized SMOs deradicalized the movements from which they were
created and led them to adopt less confrontational and more conventional tactics
in social change campaigns.23
The creation of new organizational forms by social movements is theorized
“as a political process in which social movements play a double-edged role: They
de-institutionalize existing beliefs, norms, and values embodied in extant forms,
and establish new forms that instantiate new beliefs, norms and values.”24 We ask
in this article how worker centers—founded in part due to the inadequacy of
weakened and besieged labor unions—act to instantiate those new beliefs, norms,
and values. According to Rao, Morrill & Zald, new organizational forms
originate in the interstices between established fields and at the margins.25 New
entrants who are otherwise blocked from established channels of organizational
formation and advocacy find spaces in which to develop forms that sometimes
upend the fields from which they were excluded. Worker centers began at the
margins of labor organizing (e.g., day labor, domestic work) and in the interstices
between workers’ and immigrants’ rights advocacy.
After their founding, SMOs are susceptible to social control and cooption.
The Piven and Cloward account of how organizations are corrupted or defanged
through professionalization and bureaucratization resonates deeply with stock
suspicions about people and money.26 Jenkins and Eckert confront philanthropic
funding forthrightly:
Private foundations are, after all, institutionalized agencies of the capitalist class and, as
such, will generally be politically cautious in their support for social reform. At the
minimum, their conscience donations will typically be socially circumscribed by their
class interests in political stability and the preservation of capitalist institutions.27

22. See, e.g., DOUGLAS MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY (1982).
23. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 17 at 14–36; see also INCITE!, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE
FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2nd ed. 2017).
24. Hayagreeva Rao, Calvin Morrill & Mayer N. Zald, Power Plays: How Social Movements and
Collective Action Create New Organizational Forms, 22 RESEARCH IN ORG. BEHAV. 237, 238 (2000).
25. Id. at 250 (“[N]ew organizational forms are produced at the intersections of multiple
organizational fields through social movement processes. An interstice is a gap between multiple
industries or professions and arises when problems or issues persistently spill over from one
organizational field to another. . . . Initially, many interstices experience a lack of social visibility as they
form vis-à-vis a majority of players in relevant organizational fields. Because most social attention and
authority tends to concentrate on conventional practices, many people in a given organizational field will
tend to be unaware of initial work in the gaps between fields.”); id. at 260–61.
26. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 17, at 14–36.
27. J. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage and
Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black Movement, 51 AM. SOC.
REV. 812, 819 (1986).
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But ultimately, both Jenkins and Eckert—examining the civil rights
movement of the 1960s and 1970s—and Staggenborg28—on the pro-choice
movement—conclude that funders channel rather than control or coopt SMOs:
Our evidence . . . indicates no significant change in goals or tactics, but rather a general
decline and reorganization around professional SMOs. Patronage may well have
accelerated this decline by diverting leaders from indigenous organizing, exacerbating
rivalries and creating symbolic gains. Quite clearly, it channeled the movement into
professionalization forms.29

The reconfiguration of SMOs is subtler than we might assume. Nevertheless,
writing about the NAACP in the first half of the twentieth century and
analogizing it to the current Movement for Black Lives, Francis argues that
“movement capture”—power asymmetries between community organizations
and foundations and businesses with a corporate social responsibility approach
to governance—remains a threat. Funders have in the past taken organizational
focus away from the gravest dangers to the community: fatal state and vigilante
violence against African-Americans.30
In spite of these vital exchanges in sociology, organizational formation and
change and internal decision-making remain, in the words of Minkoff and
McCarthy, “black box” processes that researchers and participants in the field
generally do not understand well.31 A focus on field-wide investigations leads
researchers to “ignore[] the emergence and impact of social movements and new
forms as they are experienced on the front lines of organizations.”32 The black
box of organizational structuration is also experienced by leaders and
participants in SMOs. According to Minkoff and McCarthy:
[I]t may not always be obvious to activist decision-makers that an operational decision
might also have major long-term consequences, and hence, in retrospect, be a strategic
decision . . . . [T]he decisions to legally incorporate and/or register for federal and state
tax status (or some combination of these) have major strategic consequences, although
many SMOs do not recognize them as such when decisions are made, nor are other
strategic implications for organizational operations, especially governance, immediately
obvious to many activists.33

In light of the opacity of these processes for both researchers and participants
in SMOs, it is especially important to consider how structural choices shape
organizational activity. For leaders and participants, the legal presumptions of
the non-profit form produce a strong gravitational pull on nascent organizations
28. Staggenborg, supra note 21.
29. Id. at 828.
30. Megan Ming Francis, The Price of Civil Rights: Black Lives, White Funding, and Movement
Capture, 53 L. & SOC. REV. 275, 278 (2019).
31. Debra Minkoff & John D. McCarthy, Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Processes in
Social Movements, 10 MOBILIZATION 289, 289 (2005); RAO ET AL., supra note 24 at 275–76
(“Organizational sociology over the past two decades has largely deserted analyses of the internal
workings of organizations . . . .”); POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 203 (“Sociologists . . . have paid little
attention to lower-profile efforts to put mobilizing structures in place and to ensure that concessions won
actually translate into local changes, and they have paid still less attention to the organizational structures
that best serve such a strategy.).
32. RAO ET AL., supra note 24, at 276.
33. Minkoff & McCarthy, supra note 31, at 299.
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and, ultimately, on the social movements that birth them.34 Further, this
relationship between law, organizations, and social movements remains largely
unexplored and undertheorized.35
B. The Challenge of Democracy and Power: Lessons from Union Governance
and the Contrast with the Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations
Labor unions were, arguably, the first large social movement organization to
attain nationwide scale and legal rights and responsibilities as recognized
institutional players in American (and European) capitalism. Given unions’
power and significance and the potential challenge they posed to corporate
dominance in the economy, union governance has unsurprisingly been a subject
of heated debate for decades.36 In each decade, the debates over the governance
and finance of worker movements have been oriented toward whatever problem
working people’s collective power presented for capitalism, for the American
government, and for the causes around which working people organize. The
1930s and 1940s saw concern over the influence of communists and radicals; over
craft-based as opposed to industrial organizing; over the processes by which
union leadership and rank-and-file workers decided on the use of strikes,
picketing, and boycotts; and over whether unions harmed American society by
being too racially inclusive or too racially exclusionary. In the 1950s and 1960s,
when union density reached its peak (at thirty-five percent of the industrial labor
force), public and scholarly concern with union governance turned to the
economic and political power of Big Labor, corruption in some unions, and the
role of labor organizations in promoting or hindering racial equality.37
An influential strand of literature on governance of worker organizations
from this era built on an early twentieth century work that posited an “iron law
of oligarchy” in civil society organizations. According to this theory,
organizations will tend toward oligarchy and conservative tactics as leaders seek

34. Id. at 300 (“Another research direction revolves around how decision-making contests are
shaped by SMO governance structures. One consequence of state registration requirements is to impose
upon conforming SMOs a board of director structure that mimics corporate boards of directors, resulting
in stark homogeneity of governance structures among registered SMOs.”).
35. See Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman, & Doug McAdam, On Law, Organizations,
and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 653 (2010).
36. See, e.g., LIPSET, TROW & COLEMAN, supra note 18.
37. See REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF
POSTWAR LIBERALISM (2015). For examples of the literature of the era expressing these concerns, see
Lloyd H. Bailer, Organized Labor and Racial Minorities, 274 ANNALS OF AM. ACADEMY OF POL. SCI.
101 (1951) (discussing racial exclusion by unions); Ray Marshall, Unions and the Negro Community, 17
ILR REV. 179 (1964) (same); John F. Kennedy, Union Racketeering: The Responsibility of the Bar, 44
AM. B. ASS’N J. 437 (1958) (explaining the work of the Senate committee investigating union
governance); Maurice F. Neufeld, The Historical Relationship of Liberals and Intellectuals to Organized
Labor in the United States, 350 ANNALS OF AM. ACADEMY OF POL. SCI. 115 (1963) (surveying literature
on evolving concerns about democracy and accountability of unions); Philip Taft, Attempts to
“Radicalize” the Labor Movement, 1 ILR REV. 580 (1948) (discussing the relationship of communism
and other radical groups to organized labor);.
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to preserve the organization rather than carry out its mission.38 As applied to
unions of the 1940s and 1950s, the question was whether the unions could retain
the democratic activist character many had in the 1930s while becoming powerful
institutions in advanced capitalism.39
As the power of organized labor withered in the 1970s, debates over union
governance began to focus on causes of decline and how unions should reorganize themselves to address new forms of capital organization, globalization,
hostile employers, and weak laws.40 Studies of unions and other worker
organizations after this period sought to understand the conditions under which
the “iron law of oligarchy” could be broken and a tendency to conservativism
could be reversed. Influential labor sociologist Kim Voss and others sought to
explain why some union locals embraced new militant tactics and the call to
recruit new members, while others succumbed to internal resistance from leaders
and members. Shifting from primarily servicing members to recruiting new ones
and engaging in disruptive activities requires a significant shift in resource
allocation to pay the researchers, “full-time staff[,] and directors . . . necessary for
many of the intensive rank-and-file techniques associated with worker
mobilization.”41 They identified three factors that reversed the conservative
nature of an oligarchical organization: First, an internal political crisis fostered
the entry of new leadership. Second, these new leaders had activist experience in
other social movements. That experience prompted them to interpret labor’s
decline as a mandate to organize and gave them the skills and vision to implement
new organizing programs. Third, international unions with leaders committed to
organizing in new ways facilitated the entry of these activists into locals and
provided locals with the resources and legitimacy to launch the process of
organizational transformation.42 Importantly, Voss and Sherman found that the
leverage for democratic transformation sometimes started from the top. Some
locals did not want to recruit new members or change their strategy, so the
international placed them into trusteeship and they then became “fully
revitalized.”43
38. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL
TENDENCIES
OF
MODERN
DEMOCRACY
(1911,
2001
repr.
ed.),
available
at
https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ ugcm/3ll3/michels/polipart.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7Y3-J5LR].
39. LIPSET, TROW & COLEMAN, supra note 18.
40. See, e.g., Jane McAlevey, The Crisis of New Labor and Alinsky’s Legacy: Revisiting the Role of
the Organic Grassroots Leaders in Building Powerful Organizations and Movements, 43 POL. & SOC. 415,
416 (2015); Peter Fairbrother et al., 2007, Unions Facing the Future: Questions and Possibilities, 31 LAB.
STUD. J. 31, 31 (2007); Kim Voss, Same as It Ever Was? New Labor, the CIO Organizing Model, and the
Future of American Unions, 43 POL. & SOC. 453, 455 (2015). On the 1970s as the end of a crucial era in
American labor history, see JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF
THE WORKING CLASS (2010), and Jefferson Cowie, Reframing the New Deal: The Past and Future of
American Labor and the Law, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 13 (2016).
41. Voss and Sherman, supra note 17, at 313 (emphasis added) (members felt that some resisted
because they did not want to return to their bartending jobs and attempted to shut out new staff).
42. Id. at 325–38.
43. Id. at 334. The authors define revitalization as the use of “shift[ing] away from servicing current
union members to organizing the unorganized and [using] unconventional disruptive tactics.” Id. at 316.
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The last twenty years of scholarly debate over union governance emphasized
the connection between worker power and union practices in connecting
leadership, staff, members, and prospective members. Loosely speaking, this is a
debate between top-down and bottom-up approaches to organizing and internal
governance. On the one hand there are campaigns that make heavy use of
researchers and paid staff to direct and mobilize workers. These are sometimes
called top-down campaigns (though the term is controversial). The underlying
theory is that, on account of weak labor law and economic change, employers are
no longer susceptible to traditional methods of union organizing or bargaining
leverage.44 As a result, the power to persuade employers to recognize a union or
sign a collective bargaining agreement is found less in disrupting production and
more in disrupting demand using “symbolic leverage” like public shaming,45
limiting investments, or political pressure.46 Some scholars believe only this mode
of campaigning can check capital’s resurgence.47
On the other hand, there are campaigns that focus on systematic whole
worker organizing and disrupting production using direct action, including strikes
and public protests, as the primary tool. This is sometimes called bottom-up
organizing. The theory here is that worker agency is the sine qua non of a
workers’ rights campaign, and the strike is the utmost expression of that agency.48
It is a high-risk tactic that proves workers are “all in,” and any resulting victory
is truly theirs. This bottom-up approach, it is believed, builds long-term power,
and reduces three sides—the employer, workers, and union—to two, with the
union and workers becoming a single group.49 While the strike deepens the
campaign by having a worker be fully invested, whole worker organizing can
broaden it by charting workers’ connections to the broader community and
drawing it into the struggle.50 Some features of a bottom-up organization include
member involvement in hiring and firing staff, approving budgets, deciding on
the direction and priorities of the organization.51 When an idea does not originate
with the membership, staff may conduct a survey to see if it the issue is important
enough to demand the organization’s resources.52 Commentators like Jane

44. Voss, supra note 17, at 355.
45. CAROLINA MUÑOZ, BUILDING POWER FROM BELOW: CHILEAN WORKERS TAKE ON
WALMART 11 (2017) (citing JENNIFER CHUN, ORGANIZING AT THE MARGINS: THE SYMBOLIC
POLITICS OF LABOR IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES (2009)).
46. Andrew Martin, The Institutional Logic of Union Organizing and the Effectiveness of Social
Movement Repertoires, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1067, 1085 (2008).
47. Tom Juravich, Beating Global Capital, A Framework and Method for Union Strategic Corporate
Research and Campaigns, in GLOBAL UNIONS: CHALLENGING TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL THROUGH
CROSS-BORDER CAMPAIGNS 16, 16 (Kate Bronfenbrenner ed. 2007).
48. JANE MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE, 38–
39 (2016).
49. Id. at 57–58
50. Id. at 69–70.
51. MCALEVEY, supra note 17, at 183.
52. Id. at 188.
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McAlevey53 and Kim Moody54 believe only bottom-up campaigns and
organizations lead to victory.
To date, there has been little empirical study of these questions in the context
of worker centers, which are the new and rapidly growing form of worker
organization.55 It is well settled in the labor literature that employer hostility to
unions, globalization, financialization, and the general decline of the union
movement mean that militant and disruptive tactics are necessary to impose
sufficient costs to gain wage increases, workplace safety, and greater worker
autonomy.56 However, both recent literature and our findings based on our
interviews with worker center leaders suggest it may not be true that militant and
disruptive tactics require expensive staff and top-down strategic organizational
control.57 And when seeking to increase long-term worker buy-in, staff control
could even be detrimental. Carolina Muñoz’s study of Chilean Wal-Mart workers
found that strong democratic processes improved strategic capacity and
increased militancy, which increased associational power and the capacity to
symbolically disrupt the business.58 This is not to say that top-down campaigns
cannot lead to long-term worker participation when they use militant and
confrontational tactics like civil disobedience. No particular type of governance
structure is necessarily required by a commitment to one organizing or leverage
approach or another. For example, mobilizing is typically associated with a topdown model, but some new worker formations are both highly democratic and
primarily mobilizing-focused.59 Likewise, an oligarchical institution is not limited
to conservative tactics.60
Beyond the union democracy and top-down versus bottom-up union
organizing debates, another major theme in the literature concerns the ways to
build organizations for worker power. In particular, Kate Andrias, Ben Sachs,
and others have proposed the revival of tripartite bargaining on a sectoral basis

53. Id. at 29.
54. KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
(1997).
55. See supra, note 12.
56. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2, 25-31 (2016); Mark Barenberg,
Widening the Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms to Facilitate Multi-Employer Organizing,
Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. 1, 3 (Oct 1, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org
[https://perma.cc/TAK5-T9TC]; Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Michael Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2016).
58. MUÑOZ, supra note 45, at 16–18. Munoz found employees shared a suspicion of the national
labor federation and were committed to democracy and militancy; in her account, the employees
considered a “real” and “grassroots union” to be one that took risks.
59. MCALEVEY, supra note 48, at 197–98
60. Craig Jenkins, Radical Transformations of Organizational Goals, 22 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 568 (1977);
Voss and Sherman, supra note 17, at 303. A detailed, empirically rich, and carefully theorized work
exploring the variety of organizations involved in the huge nationwide immigrants protests of 2006
reveals that the bottom-up versus top-down dichotomy is inadequate to understanding some mass
mobilizations. CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLAN, LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION: IMMIGRATION,
RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM (2017).
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as crucial to reverse growing economic inequality.61 As Andrias and others who
advocate tripartite and sectoral bargaining recognize, to assure effective
representation of workers, it is necessary that worker organizations who are
empowered by any legal regime to engage in tripartism are genuinely
representative of and accountable to the workers on whose behalf they bargain.62
This need not be a union, but it does need to be representative and accountable
to workers. Realistically, given that nationwide worker center organizations that
do not engage in collective bargaining are already engaged in political activism,
negotiation with high-road employers, and pressuring low-road employers, they
will be part of any new initiatives to use law to improve labor standards. Hence,
it matters to everyone whether worker organizations are truly democratic.
The foregoing brief summary of the literatures on social movement
organizations and on union governance reveals that democracy in worker
organizations is valued both instrumentally and inherently, although the
emphasis on one or the other differs. For example, some scholars emphasize its
ability to increase strategic capacity and associational power,63 and others find
that democracy increases internal solidarity.64 On this analysis, robust democracy
can protect against high-level decision-makers taking an accommodating stance
instead of resisting employer power.65 Others clearly articulate the intrinsic value
of internal democracy and view any effectiveness undemocratic unions may have
as illegitimate, similar to gains made through blackmail or violence.66
Of course, any instrumental theory—i.e., that a democratic organization or
one with high levels of worker participation is more likely to win—invites the
61. Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616 (2019) (advocating the revival of tripartite bargaining and
exploring its implementation under the Fair Labor Standards Act between 1938 and 1949); Kate Andrias,
The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016) (advocating sectoral bargaining); Kate Andrias & Brishen
Rogers, Rebuilding Worker Voice in Today’s Economy, The Roosevelt Institute (Aug. 2018); Benjamin
Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011)
(describing tripartism in state and local economic development programs and labor regulation).
62. Cf, Andrias & Rogers, Rebuilding Worker Voice, supra note 61, at 24-25 (proposing ways to
increase worker voice in the workplace).
63. MUÑOZ, supra note 45, at 17 (using Marshall Ganz’s theory of strategic capacity, Resources and
Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1003
(2000) and Erik Olin Wright’s theory on associational power, Working Class Power, Capitalist-Class
Interests, and Class Compromise, 105 AM. J. SOC. 957 (2000).
64. Peter Fairbrother, Rethinking Trade Unionism: Union Renewal as Transition, 26 LAB. RELS.
REV. 561, 570 (2015).
65. MCALEVEY, supra note 48, at 957 (quoting David Rolf as saying, “Wouldn’t it be something if
people thought unions weren’t about creating problems but they were actually about working with
management to solve problems? Where is it written that the thing we need to do most is have fights”);
id. at 81 (explaining SEIU 775’s “top-secret” agreement that unionized nursing home workers in
Washington, resulting in little increase in wages or improvement in working conditions); Ian Thomas
MacDonald, Towards Neoliberal Trade Unionism: Decline, Renewal and Transformation in North
American Labour Movements, 52 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 725 (2014) (focusing on union leadership
accommodation of public employers).
66. Gregor Gall and Jack Fioreto, Union Effectiveness: In Search of the Holy Grail, 37 ECON. &
INDUS. DEMOCRACY 189, 191 (2016) (“[U]nions are of, by and for workers . . . [which] defines their
character, means, purpose, and interests”).
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question, “win what?” One wide-ranging survey of union campaigns defined
success as getting a contract.67 Other scholars, however, recognize that losing can
be winning when the campaign leads to a shift in power,68 and that winning can
be losing when the campaign achieves its goal of securing a collective bargaining
agreement but the workers themselves did not gain power and instead rely on a
third party to monitor and enforce the agreement.69 Because the campaign and
its goals teach workers to “be union,” whether the campaign is conducted
democratically as a function of worker agency or bureaucratically through staff
direction has consequences beyond immediate success.70 For example,
demanding wage increases and pensions can improve workers’ quality of life, but
demanding autonomy and control over production can improve immediate
material conditions, set the foundation for vigorous enforcement, and “enable a
majority of workers to engage in mass collective struggle.”71 According to Linda
Markowitz’s 1998 study, so-called blitz campaigns which involve significant
worker participation result in longer term participation within the union after a
win than after comprehensive campaigns.72
On the whole, the literature on worker organization governance considers
democracy as a factor to which different analyses give different degrees of
emphasis in describing the relationship between a worker organization’s purpose,
strategic capacity, and organizational structure.73 Moreover, although all labor
scholars agree that organizations are more democratic to the extent they develop
members into leaders, there is some scholarly disagreement over what methods
of leadership development have been most effective in the labor movement.74
Another salient debate in the labor law literature has to do with the financial
model of worker organizations. For a long time, the regulation of union dues was
of interest to many labor lawyers but few scholars. The right-wing litigation attack
on union dues has, however, put the question of union funding in headlines and
in prominent law reviews.75 Only unions, among contemporary worker
67. Hickey et. al, No Panacea for Success: Member Activism, Organizing and Union Renewal, 48
BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 53, 54 (2010).
68. EVE S. WEINBAUM, TO MOVE A MOUNTAIN: FIGHTING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN
APPALACHIA (2004).
69. MCALEVEY, supra note 48, at 58; LINDA MARKOWITZ, WORKER ACTIVISM AFTER
SUCCESSFUL UNION ORGANIZING (2000).
70. Linda Markowitz, After the Organizing Ends: Workers, Self-Efficacy, Activism and Union
Frameworks, 45 SOC. PROBS. 356 (1998).
71. MCALEVEY, supra note 48, at 56; see also Melanie Simms, Imagined Solidarities: Where is Class
in Union Organizing? 35 CAP. & CLASS 97, 111 (using Richard Hyman’s typology of union identities
(class, market, and social), UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONISM: BETWEEN MARKET,
CLASS AND SOCIETY (2001), and arguing that unions should shift to building a class identity).
72. MARKOWITZ, supra note 70, at 379.
73. Fairbrother, supra note 64, at 563.
74. See, e.g., Stuart Eimer, The Crisis of New Labor and Alinsky’s Legacy: Some Questions,
Comments, and Problems, 43 POL. & SOC. 443, 444–45 (2015); Paul Osterman, Building Progressive
Organizations: An Alternative View, 43 POL. & SOC. 447, 449 (2015).
75. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The
law review literature on Janus is already too voluminous to cite.
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formations, have adopted a dues model. Others rely on foundation and other
philanthropic funding. Unions insist that dues keep the leadership accountable
to the membership. One goal of this study was to consider whether the
philanthropic funding model exerts indirect pressure to shape the tactics, strategy
and priorities of the organization.76
Worker centers and unions are governed by significantly different law
regulating their internal governance. In contrast to labor unions, worker centers
are governed primarily by the law of tax-exempt organizations, which is much
less intrusive, provides less transparency to the public and to members, and does
not require the organization to operate as a democracy. Another goal of this
study was to consider whether the issues that led to the unique and uniquely
intrusive regulatory structure for internal union affairs are appearing in worker
centers. As will become apparent below, we find they are not.
Worker centers are generally established as nonprofits under § 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Under § 501(c)(3) and state nonprofit corporation
law, a nonprofit organization needs to have a board of directors and must adhere
to certain limits on use of funds to maintain its tax-exempt status, but there is no
legal requirement that the organization involve its members in internal
governance.77
76. See MCALEVEY, supra note 48, at 196–98 (saying that power struggles between related (c)(4)
and (c)(3) boards of a worker center resulted in a less democratic arrangement as the better-funded board
began to influence the other).
77. 1 HUGH WEBSTER, THE LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS § 2.06 (Matthew Bender 2018) (State
nonprofit corporation statutes generally require that associations have a board, and the lack of a board
of directors can result in loss of corporate status) citing Cmty. & Human Servs. v. N.W. Defenders, 75
P.3d 583 (Wash. App. 2004) (association directors resigned and were never replaced). Chapter 2
(“Governance”) of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS Tent. Draft No. 2 (dated March 20, 2017) and Tent. Draft No. 1 (dated April 13, 2016)
summarizes the law of the 50 states in Comments & Illustrations by saying: “Most states require a
governing board of a charity that is a corporation to be composed of at least three directors, although
some states require only one. A few states require at least a majority of the directors to be independent.
Although the requirements differ by state, independent board members are those who are not, for
example, current or recent employees of the charity or close relatives of such persons.” § 2.05, cmt. c. See,
e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (1988) (“Each corporation must have a board
of directors.”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5210 (2014); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney
2015); Ciamaichelo v. Independence Blue Cross, 928 A.2d 407, 410 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (“the business
and affairs of every nonprofit corporation must be managed under the direction of the board of
directors or other body”). See generally Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling
Through the Gaps Between Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521 (2007).
Some states allow the membership to function in lieu of a board and/or allow exceptions to the
requirement that a charity must be governed by a board. For example, Delaware law states, “The business
and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011 & Supp. 2014). Similarly, New York statute
provides that a nonprofit corporation will be managed by a board “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation.” N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION LAW § 701(a) (McKinney 2015)
The Internal Revenue Service defines the governing body of a nonprofit organization as follows: “The
governing body is the group of one or more persons authorized under state law to make governance
decisions on behalf of the organization and its shareholders or members, if applicable. The governing
body is, generally speaking, the board of directors (sometimes referred to as board of trustees) of a
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Labor organizations are § 501(c)(5) organizations, subject to slightly different
rules for tax-exempt activities, and subject to much greater federally-mandated
reporting and disclosure obligations under the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin).78 The LMRDA was,
in part, intended to ensure that unions remained responsive to members, and the
law also regulated union’s obligations to nonmembers.79 Legal regulation was,
from the start, deeply tied to hostility to union power as well as to desire for union
democracy. As unions rapidly gained the power and responsibility to bargain
after 1937, to collect dues from members and fees from nonmembers, and to
administer the collective bargaining agreements and their social welfare funds,
the arguments for extensive regulation of their governance and finances gained
strength. Once chosen as an exclusive representative in a bargaining unit, they
owe duties of fair representation to all workers in the unit, regardless of whether
the worker chooses to join. In the public sector and in over half the states, they
owe such duties even to those who pay no fees for the services that the unions are
required by law to provide. Little scholarly attention has been paid lately to the
administrative costs of such regulation, its efficacy in ensuring financial probity
and member accountability, and the risks of such regulation to other goals.
A final goal of this project is to understand whether worker formations that
are not subject to all this regulation have developed mechanisms of transparency
and accountability to members. In other words, what difference does it make that
worker centers and other worker formations that are not labor organizations are
subject to distinctively different legal regulation?
III.
GOVERNANCE APPROACHES
This part of the article reports our methods and findings. Subpart A explains
our methods. Subpart B discusses, in general terms, the resources worker centers
rely on to conduct the campaigns that are the core of their work. Subpart C
explores variations in the structure and operations of worker centers that modify
organizational approaches to worker voice and leadership. Subpart D discusses

corporation or association . . ..” Instructions for Form 990, at 18 (2014). For the purposes of Form 990,
the annual information return filed by charities, members of the governing body are defined as “members
of the governing body of the organization with power to vote on all matters that come before the
governing body (other than when a conflict of interest disqualifies the member from voting).” Id.
78. The Internal Revenue Code’s provision on tax exempt organizations contains several
subsections. 26 U.S.C. 501(c). Subsection (c)(5) provides that among the organizations exempt from
taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(a) are “labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations.”
Title II of the LMRDA requires extensive reporting to the federal government and disclosure to
union members. 29 U.S.C. section 431 requires reporting by labor unions. Section 432 requires reporting
by officers and employees of labor unions. Title IV regulates the selection of union leadership, requiring
regular elections by secret ballot among members in good standing. 29 U.S.C. 481.
79. See, e.g., MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 34-48 (1988)
(describing the origins and purposes of the LMRDA); 29 U.S.C. 401 (Congressional findings, purposes,
and policy of LMRDA).
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the ways in which worker center leaders involve workers in decision-making,
both in the governance of the organization and in campaigns.
A. Methods
This article is based on eight interviews with nine worker center leaders
conducted in 2016 and 2017. Three of our interview subjects are lawyers who have
been involved with multiple worker centers in major cities across the United
States. Their experience included working with local worker centers and national
alliances of worker centers from the 1990s to the present. Throughout the article,
the lawyers will be consistently referred to individually by the pseudonyms
Steven, Ruben, and Marianne. Six are organizers who worked in both local
worker centers and with statewide or nationwide alliances. Similarly, the
organizers will consistently be referred to individually by the pseudonyms
Robert, Jennifer, Paula, Hanna, John, and Henry. Jennifer and Paula completed
a joint telephone interview, so they will often be referred to in tandem. The
interview subjects were selected for their expertise and the breadth of experience
with different types of worker centers. The sample is neither random nor
representative of all worker centers nationwide. Rather, we envisioned the
sample as being a pilot study for a larger and more systematic study of worker
centers.
The interviews were conducted primarily over the telephone. They were
recorded and transcribed. Each interview lasted approximately an hour. The
interviews were semi-structured, as we asked each the same questions focusing
on governance and finance, but also asked follow up questions based on the
answers.
B. Underpinnings of Worker Voice
The projection of worker voice in worker center campaigns is undergirded by
at least four types of resources: philanthropic funding, paid organizing staff,
collaborations with unions, and, increasingly, collaborations with local
government agencies. We briefly summarize what our interviews revealed about
how worker centers use these four types of resources.
First, foundations supported early waves of worker center formation and
activism and continue to be an important source of support. Our interviews
confirmed the general perception that foundation funding has been, and remains,
essential to the operations of worker centers.80 Low-wage immigrant workers fall
through the gaps in the frayed support network of civil society organizations and
80. For example, Jennifer and Paula explained, “in the initial phases of the organization, it was really
important to have that level of investment and for philanthropy, you have to take a risk on a movement
like black women and women of color. It’s such a given that a union labor has traditionally ignored this
workforce. Electoral and civic organizations have ignored this workforce being community members. It
was important to have that support.” Telephone interview with Jennifer and Paula, organizers (June 29,
2016) (transcript on file with authors). For ease of citation, after the first reference to an interview, we
do not footnote each individual interview transcript. Rather, we refer to the interviewees by their
pseudonym.
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governmental agencies in the United States. Worker centers organized workers
who had been overlooked by unions and who were, in many cases, excluded from
most labor and employment law protections, poorly paid, and under-resourced.
Foundation support was crucial to enable the work. Foundations, most
prominently Ford, recognized that philanthropic funding was necessary to
support and expand this organizing work. Program officers’ views about how to
address the challenges of poverty and low wage work aligned with the approach
of leaders in some of the expanding worker center networks in low-wage sectors
of the economy, such as domestic and restaurant work.81
The reliance on foundation funding presents the possibility that an
organization’s agenda may be shaped by the terms of a foundation’ grant rather
than by the needs or goals of workers. We found that the threat was more
theoretical than real. While acknowledging some programmatic constraints
placed on grant recipients, worker center leaders reported that foundations have
not dictated their agenda.82 The more realistic possibility, our interviews
revealed, is that if foundations were to decide that general operating support
channeled toward base building is no longer a priority, worker centers would
have to scramble to replace the funding.
Second, as noted above, most of the established worker centers that were the
focus of this study have some paid staff and a larger number of volunteers.83 The
paid organizers and administrators on worker center staffs typically had some
prior, albeit limited, experience as organizers in progressive, immigrant-friendly
union entities. In a few cases, they had work experience in the sector being
organized. The volunteers are drawn from the community in which the worker
center works. Marianne, a lawyer who works with multiple worker centers,
explained the transition from being a worker volunteer to a staffer:
[A] worker leader who becomes an organizer, I think the work - . . . [c]ould be similar
to what they were doing as a volunteer member leader, but there’s a deeper investment
because the person is on staff and so obviously, just the sheer time issue of more . . . .
As a paid organizer, you don’t have to negotiate how does the worker deal with work,
domestic work, and then doing campaign and political work, social justice work on a
voluntarily basis.84

Third, worker centers have been engaged in long-term collaborations with
unions. In sectors such as domestic and home care and warehouse work, worker
centers are engaged in established collaborations that extend from financial
support to referrals of workers for union organizing campaigns. There are several
81. Steven explained the commitment of the Ford Foundation to the worker center movement by
noting that the foundation program officers’ “politics are very aligned with groups like ROC and
NDWA.” Telephone interview with Steven, lawyer (June 13, 2016) (transcript on file with authors).
82. Of course, there are strong incentives for both leaders and foundations to resist the notion of
control or cooption. However, we found that the structural commitments of organizations matched
leader assurances on this point.
83. Voluntary worker associations continue to develop across sectors and particularly in regions of
the country with less civic infrastructure. The more established workers centers that are the focus of this
article are actively considering how to integrate this type of bottom-up activism.
84. Telephone interview with Marianne, lawyer (June 13, 2016) (transcript on file with authors).
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noteworthy examples, many of which were identified in our interviews: Caring
Across Generations is an alliance of the National Domestic Workers Alliance
(NDWA) with Service Employees International Union (SEIU). The Fight for 15
campaign has been a project of SEIU. The National Day Laborer Organizing
Network (NDLON) has had some support from the Laborers’ International
Union of North America (LIUNA). OUR Walmart was originally supported by
the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW).85
Local worker centers also collaborate frequently with unions, as illustrated by the
Clean Carwash campaign in Los Angeles or Arise-Chicago.
Fourth, worker centers are increasingly collaborating with government
agencies, particularly on enforcement campaigns in progressive jurisdictions with
expansive, but under-enforced legal protections for workers.86 Worker centers
have initiated collaborative relationships with local labor standards enforcement
agencies in New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, with state agencies in
California, and with federal and state health and safety agencies in Illinois and
California. We found that these co-enforcement initiatives strengthened working
relationships between worker centers and government enforcement agencies and
worker center leaders perceive that these partnerships improve enforcement.87
These collaborations have generated a limited amount of financial support for
worker centers. The financial support is in the form of government grants to
85. Steven and Ruben both noted this. Ruben explained that the city-wide worker center for which
they had worked connects workers who “have a certain level of organizing or development that they
wanna form a union” with “labor unions that will then be unionizing part and then it sort of helps with
the workplace campaign.” Telephone interview with Ruben, lawyer (June 8, 2016) (transcript on file with
authors).
86. Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-enforcement
Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed? 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359 (2017); Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon,
Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement Through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 L. &
POL’Y REV. 552 (2010); Seema Patel & Catherine Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that
Facilitate Worker Organizing, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (2018).
87. As Hanna, a worker center organizer, explained: “[W]e definitely have a strong working
relationship with the labor commissioner and the DIR, one of our anchor organizations, Pilipino Workers
Center in LA, is part of the new collaboration between Julie Su’s office and BOFE. . . . But, in practice,
a lot of the Filipino caregivers that work in these homes actually also work in private care. It’s a pretty
affluent industry, so they’re partnering with the labor commissioner on that and. . . . But it’s definitely
giving us the opportunity, and there’s a real commitment to build strong relationships, particularly with
BOFE investigators, who have also expressed an interest in doing enforcement in the home care industry.
And Pilipino Workers Center also has this big flagship case with BOFE and the City Attorney of Los
Angeles against a home care agency for about $9 Million of unpaid minimum wage and overtime
violations for 200 workers with Health Alliance. . . . [T]here’s definite growing partnership with labor
agencies, and I think on the home care side it gives us the potential to leverage the city attorney, which
has been really interesting. . . . [I]t’s a question for us, just thinking about how to deepen that partnership
in other places where there aren’t city based or municipal labor agencies. And I think we’re thinking
about also partnering with the labor commissioner around training of deputies. Just building relationships
with deputies in different cities and providing, from the worker center perspective, just some kind of
working knowledge of the domestic worker industry.” Telephone interview with Hanna, organizer
(February 6, 2018) (transcript on file with authors).
Ruben also echoed the same point: “They get some very minimal funding from, say like, OSHA, has
a grant to train folks in health and safety. So they get a little bit of money from OSHA if they incorporate
health and safety in their basic workshops.”
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facilitate investigation and enforcement of minimum labor standards violations
and training in know-your-rights programs.88 In addition to providing modest
financial support for work that the center does regardless of such support—
training workers in their rights and assisting them in pressing wage theft
claims89—the co-enforcement collaborations with city and state agencies create
connections with government officials, improve enforcement prospectively, and
settle claims for unpaid wages for worker members.90
C. Variations
Social movement organizations engaged in sectoral organizing and
bargaining are pluralistic in their relative commitment to worker voice and
worker leadership within their organizations. We found that certain factors,
examined below, were important in shaping the governance choices of worker
centers.
1. Modes of Advocacy
Our interviewees worked in or with worker centers engaged in a wide range
of political and legal activity, including litigation, policy advocacy, and cultural
transformation. Their advocacy choices were both shaped by and, in turn, shaped
the organizations themselves.
A number of worker centers relied on litigation in the early stages of their
development, generally in cases in which an individual or group of workers were
represented by a legal team assembled by the worker center.91 The worker center
would run an issue campaign using the case to advance allegations of lawbreaking
by employers and then leverage litigation settlement negotiations for agreements
that provided remedies for individual workers, as well as some forms of
generalized relief like new hiring and promotion policies.92 Over time, some
worker centers moved toward larger class actions on behalf of employees at
larger workplaces or across a large chain of businesses. Legal scholar Lucie White

88. Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society, supra note 86; Patel & Fisk,
supra note 86.
89. As Ruben remarked: “They get some very minimal funding from, say like, OSHA, has a grant
to train folks in health and safety. So they get a little bit of money from OSHA if they incorporate health
and safety in their basic workshops.”
90. Hanna noted “we’re thinking about also partnering with the labor commissioner around training
of deputies. Just building relationships with deputies in different cities and providing, from the worker
center perspective, just some kind of working knowledge of the domestic worker industry.”
91. Steven explained: “It is true that if you looked back, I’m not sure of the timeframe, six years or
so, [ROC] would be mainly doing workplace justice campaigns of the kind you’re describing, which would
include a lot of demonstrations in pressure but also litigation. And they were gearing up for a big one
against Darden, which moves them from high-end to mid-level, and to a huge international chain. And
they seem to have. . . At a certain point, that became less emphasized.”
92. See Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1879 (2007); Benjamin Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008);
Sameer M. Ashar, Advancing Low-Wage Worker Organizing Through Legal Representation, 47
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313 (2013).
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calls these types of campaigns “mobilization on the margins of the lawsuit.”93 In
litigation-centered or litigation-adjacent organizing, worker centers develop the
leadership skills of plaintiffs as they navigate decision-making in cases and
complicated, triangulated relationships with lawyers. Organizations also mount
ongoing political education programs as a means by which to keep groups of
plaintiffs united and focused on settlements that included elements apart from
remedies for individual violations.
A second significant mode of advocacy pursued by worker centers is policy
advocacy. Organizers have pivoted from campaigns focused on particular
workplaces toward local, state, and national policy initiatives.94 They have
secured enactment of laws creating “bills of rights” for domestic workers, higher
wages and sick days for restaurant workers, and health and safety protections for
warehouse workers. Through these legislative and policy campaigns, worker
centers have gradually developed the capacity to advocate for changes in law that
offer protections for low-wage workers beyond their sectoral focus. Ruben
observed that organizations have originated their own policy campaigns and
joined ones started by others, such as Fight for 15. The localized workplace justice
campaigns, often relying on litigation, keep key members engaged and energized.
Ruben described effective organizers as those who draw those engaged members
into wider-ranging policy campaigns.
A primary role that worker-members play in these policy campaigns is to
testify about their conditions of work and the need for new laws and regulations.
This role—and the accompanying necessary leadership development and
political education offered by organizers—was described extensively in Jennifer
Gordon’s case study of the passage of the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act in New
York in 1997.95 Robert marveled at the effectiveness of worker testimony in the
face of employer lobbying at the state level:
These guys sit in air conditioned offices all day, and having a real worker standing across
. . . from you . . . . I remember last week, the meeting, they were talking about cost . . .
and they’re like, “Oh, it’s gonna be $40 per employee to deal with this issue,” and “How
do we abate this cost?” And . . . one [of] the workers, went up and was like, “My life is
worth more than $40.” And that just shut the entire [group up]. All these $500 an hour
lobbyists, for whatever reason couldn’t, didn’t have the guts to stand up, and say
anything after that.

The power of worker testimony imposes a type of discipline or accountability
as organizations identify issues around which to build campaigns. A wage floor is
a much more compelling and salient demand for workers and the broader public
than joint liability for companies in a production chain, for example. Robert put
it bluntly: “Talking about working conditions in the context of $15.00 an hour,
93. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak,
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987–88).
94. Both Steven and Ruben made this observation..
95. Jennifer Gordon, Campaign for the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act: Latino Immigrants Change
New York Wage Law, https://carnegieendowment.org/1999/08/01/campaign-for-unpaid-wagesprohibition-act-latino-immigrants-change-new-york-wage-law-pub-513 [https://perma.cc/7CAT-76V5]
(1999).
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it’s very clear and very simple and compelling story. Joint employment, liability,
up-the-chain for logistics companies is complicated and obscure, and nobody
really cares.” These more foundational campaigns also have broader effect, as
Robert explained:
You have the same fight, ‘cause the Chamber of Commerce is gonna fight you as hard
on something specific as on something broad. But you don’t get the bang for your buck.
That’s our hope, is to try to get more that comes from the workers, or from the worker
organizations, in terms of policies that are much more down the middle.96

Worker-members have a fairly direct role in selecting and testing the value
and political viability of policy initiatives.
Another role that worker-members play in legislative campaigns is in
deciding when and how to compromise as advocates attempt to push a bill over
obstacles to enactment. Much of the leadership development and political
education in one of the organizations that we examined focused on this moment
of compromise in the legislative process. As Jennifer and Paula observed, this is
a moment in which accountability mechanisms may break down, if organizational
leaders decide to take a win at the expense of the deeper and longer-term goals
of the organizing. The organization prioritizes the development of collective
principles to guide members and leaders in the legislative process. Ultimately,
Jennifer and Paula concluded, the wins in the legislative process have to unify
rather than divide workers; a win is not a win if portions of the worker base are
disempowered or made marginal in the legislative process.
Enforcement is another context in which it may be challenging to maintain
worker voice. Hanna reflected, “as we win more rights, then it becomes
enforcement, and then we’ll have to figure out what centralized state decisionmaking looks like around enforcement, and how we maintain worker voice, and
being worker-driven with organizational autonomy.” Co-enforcement—agencyworker center collaborations described above in Part III.B.—97 is one response
to this challenge. Part of the benefit of a worker-driven policy agenda is the
inherent capacity of members to go back to their workplaces after a legislative
win and point out to their managers that there’s a new law on the books that
provides some protection.98 Accountability to workers in the process of issue
identification paves the way toward their involvement in struggles to enforce new
laws in a time of governmental austerity and withdrawal from the employeremployee relationship.

96. Robert elaborated on the challenges of engaging workers and the public around campaigns that
challenge the structure of an industry rather than just the workers’ current conditions: “Why are we
allowing workplaces to be 100% temporary? Why are we allowing people to be temps for five years, 10
years, without being a direct? Those kinds of conversations are things that we think will be more
compelling for the workers. Probably you have much bigger impact, but also we need to bring the public
into it, the general public. And so that’s kind of what we’ve learned, is incremental little things here and
there . . . .”
97. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
98. As Robert put it: “It doubles back to those workers, again taking these heat breaks at work
saying, ‘Hey, there’s a policy.’ It’s perfect, right?”
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Finally, some worker centers, particularly the larger national networks, aim
for deeper cultural shifts. Like the pivot from workplace justice campaigns to
policy advocacy, the shift from litigation and legislation to cultural production is
an important one that differentiates organizations and poses new challenges to
worker voice and autonomy.99 This is, in part, a reflection of the limits placed on
the state to enforce new laws and judgments in litigation. These efforts are both
incredibly ambitious and also quite pragmatic. As Steven put it, these efforts
pragmatically attempt to improve compliance with new laws while they
ambitiously identify areas of interest convergence that might mobilize new
sources of power in fights on behalf of low-wage workers. Because of the way in
which political and popular culture is formed in the United States, efforts to shift
ideology and the value of low-wage work through cultural production tend to
emphasize the role of more familiar, highly educated, and articulate non-worker
leaders.100 This type of work is a test of the commitment of organizers to worker
voice and the governance and accountability infrastructure developed within
their organizations.
2. Relative Economic and Political Power of Employers
The forces opposing low-wage worker initiatives differ across sectors, in part
because the structures of economic sectors differ. There is an accelerating trend
toward disaggregation in some sectors and toward scale in others. For example,
domestic workers are distributed across homes in which they are usually the only
employee. Their employers generally have not organized to oppose policy
initiatives that they may be advocating.101 There is a fair amount of consolidation
in the restaurant industry, on the other hand, and many large employers are part
of the National Restaurant Association (NRA), which opposes initiatives
intended to improve the work conditions of low-wage workers in their industry.
Further, the NRA has repeatedly attempted to run campaigns against worker
centers in the sector and have them reclassified as union organizations, with
accompanying burdensome regulatory requirements and limits on organizing and
activism.102 For warehouse workers, Robert explained, employers have created
attenuated relationships with workers through the use of temporary work

99. Jennifer and Paula described their goal of producing a cultural shift as follows: “One is that like
the terrain that it’s not only around structural changes and legislative wins but ultimately that the tone,
ideology and culture in a norm on a societal level need to be are up to be defined. And that’s a huge part
of the arena that we tried to contest as well because ultimately, a private employer in their home is gonna
make a decision about what to pay a worker even if the law states, the laws are helpful, but also some of
it has to do with a change in culture and ideology in terms of how this work is valued.”
100. See, e.g., Ai-Jen Poo, I was Meryl Streep’s “Plus One” at the Golden Globes, COSMOPOLITAN
(Jan. 10, 2018), available at https://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a15003277/meryl-streep-ai-jen-poogolden-globes-essay/ [https://perma.cc/784G-59BG].
101. Steven drew the contrast between strategies generated by the structure of the domestic work
sector as compared to other sectors: ”So the contrast with NDWA is really very interesting. One
difference, of course, is that NDWA has no adversary. Nobody’s opposed. And there’s no economic
interest is challenged.”
102. Id.
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agencies, while growing in scale as e-commerce claims a larger market share of
the retail sector. But unlike the restaurant industry, there isn’t as much unity
amongst employers.103 Sectors in which technological platforms have come to the
fore, such as ride hailing, have seen both increasing disaggregation of the
workforce and expanded scale.104
The variation across sectors causes differentiated worker governance goals
and practices in worker centers. In sectors without organized opposition, call it
Sector A, there is much greater emphasis on the development of individual
worker capacity and personal transformation. There is more networked
decentralization.105 The campaigns are less adversarial.106 In sectors with powerful
and organized opposition, call it Sector B, organizations tend to be more
hierarchical and have greater message discipline up and down affiliate
networks.107 There is less affiliate autonomy and less decentralized decisionmaking, which comes at the expense of localized experiments in developing
worker voice in governance activities. In a third type of sector, call it Sector C, in
which there is disaggregation through contingent work arrangements but scaled
up work sites, worker centers have to develop cross-employer regional advocacy
efforts; these conditions also explain the pivot from workplace justice
campaigns—very challenging at a work site with 500 workers hired through
temporary agencies—toward policy initiatives.108 As in Sector A, disaggregation
demands more investment in the development of individual worker voice and
leadership, or in Robert’s words, a “need to figure out how to make people feel
bigger.”

103. Robert elaborated: “I have the Home Depot guys, logistics guys based in Atlanta, and the
Walmart guys based in Arkansas. They all hate each other. I think that’s being part of a global system.
They don’t collude on our level. And they don’t really . . . It’s not really worth it. Maybe we’re not big
enough or bad enough to have an impact. That’s what we see. In terms of the staffing agencies, similarly
it’s just like shark pit, and those guys are just constantly trying to slash each other’s throats. The
blacklisting, it takes some level of trust, and those guys are all just stinks. [chuckle] They can’t really get
it together to blacklist either. And there’s always another staffing agency. That’s not to say public activists
have no trouble getting more work, but they get something. And again, the region’s so big. You can get
by.”
104. This is a point Hanna raised. As none of our interviews focused on organizing workers engaged
in platform-based work, we caution that our findings may not be generalizable to organizing such
workers.
105. See infra Part III.C.3.
106. Jennifer and Paula put it this way: “So in some ways it’s like, sure, there’s definitely been
conversations about, what is organizing with love? Whatever, and I think it’s worked. And I think
ultimately just to build off of that, in some ways given the industry or given domestic work and given that
it’s a one-to-one employer/worker relationship and also, as [Jennifer] was pointing out, the actual work
of caring, there’s a certain level of interest in that emotional labor that goes into this work and some of
it’s actually more complicated than who’s the boss and then there’s workers in a factory context.”
107. See POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 6 (“responding quickly to the aggressive action of movement
opponents may require leaders’ unilateral action”).
108. Robert made this point.
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3. Organizational Development and Affiliate Structure
As discussed in the preceding subpart, some sectors enable greater network
decentralization, which, in turn, allows for variation and experimentation with
organizational governance across networks. Hanna, Jennifer, and Paula noted
that organizations transmit information and organizing strategies up and down
the network and organizers import lessons from their work at other types of
organizations, such as unions. Key nodes in a network set a floor for democratic
governance but, as Hanna observed, allow affiliates to develop the specific
mechanisms that will be used to ensure worker voice and accountability to the
membership. That floor ensures that organizational decisions and perspectives
“are vetted by and emerge from your membership,” as Hanna put it. Those nodes
may exercise a modest amount of power over affiliates by re-granting funds.
Jennifer and Paula explicitly indicated that they sought to use resource
transmission to affiliates (both in the form of funding and capacity-building) to
counter the nonprofit form, to cause “a shift in their culture, in their structures
and in their notion of what leadership means.” The affiliates that are most
committed to experimentation with worker governance and voice tend to be the
ones that are most central in the substantive advocacy initiatives being advanced
by the network. Organizations will use national convenings of organizers and
workers from across the network to share knowledge and advance governance
principles that can be taken back to affiliates that may be less developed.
The origins of a network also contribute to shaping its development. Jennifer
and Paula explained that, in their experience, networks built up from local
organizing in different parts of the United States reserve more local authority
over organizational development at the grassroots (countered to some degree by
downward resource distribution). In other cases, national networks create local
affiliates, with greater requisite input on the structure and governance of those
affiliates.109
Stand-alone worker centers develop creative governance practices, as well. In
some cases, worker centers are autonomous projects within larger nonprofit
organizations and have an independent governance structure that is less
conventional than the host nonprofit’s and more worker-centered.110
4. Organizational Resources and Capacity
The larger worker center networks—such as Restaurant Opportunities
Center (ROC), NDWA, NDLON, and National Guestworkers Alliance—have
benefited from strong support from large foundations, particularly the Ford
Foundation.111 In a portion of the work force earlier ignored by unions and
109. See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 19, at 1227–28 (“Federation development out of preexisting
groups can occur quite rapidly, while organizing unattached individuals probably requires more time and
resources.”).
110. Hanna said: “I don’t see very clearly how worker centers housed within 501(c)(3) structures
carve out space for worker decision-making and autonomy and how it interacts, and what may be the
tensions are with the 501(c)(3) model.”
111. Marianne, Jennifer and Paula made this point.
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electoral and civic organizations, foundation funding was key in the startup,
expansion, and consolidation phases of many worker center networks. Particular
program officers have been especially supportive of and patient with worker
center networks.112
All worker centers, but particularly smaller worker center networks and
stand-alone organizations, grapple with uncertainty and piece together funding
from multiple sources, including foundations, membership fees, individual
donors, unions, church congregations, and local governmental contracts.113
Smaller foundations without a record of support for workers remain confused
about what worker centers do, which requires that leaders spend time
communicating with foundation officers.114 The idea that nonprofit organizations
have to fill the gaps left by de-unionization remains relatively novel, though Janus
may be a wake-up call for funders.115 Jennifer and Paula spoke at length about
this, explaining that many foundations have theories of change focused on
particular policy changes and electoral work rather than organizing and base
building. Uncertainty and lack of funding for operations and organizing constrain
smaller worker center networks and stand-alone organizations. The lack of staff
support, they worried, may cause those organizations to skip a step in internal
governance. In spite of the best intentions with regard to worker voice and
autonomy in organizational governance, limited funding hinders the
development and implementation of creative and labor-intensive bottom-up
leadership efforts.
5. Membership Models
Worker centers have considered different membership models, though the
organizations appear to do so with an awareness of the dangers of a transactional
model in which workers pay dues in exchange for services. Ruben explained that
both the national networks and stand-alone organizations base their
development on an identity in opposition to service organizations, such as legal
services offices and unions that emphasized member services over organizing.
However, the lack of collective bargaining representation undercuts the value
proposition for workers, as Steven worried: Exactly what services do they get
from worker centers that are not time limited, such as ROC’s job training
programs?116
Still, our interviewees thought of the membership model as one that can aid
in the quest for financial sustainability, though it would likely not eliminate
dependence on other sources of funding. Jennifer and Paula report their
organization aspires to have over two hundred thousand members nationwide by

112. Marianne and Steven both noted this.
113. Ruben’s organization is an example of this kind of patchwork of funding.
114. Jennifer and Paula made this observation.
115. Id.
116. But see POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 12 (“Participatory democracy’s solidarity benefits
counteract movement groups’ inability to offer much in the way of selective incentives to participate.”).
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2020. If they succeed, it would dramatically change the financial situation of the
organization because even a small sum in dues would generate sufficient revenue
to pay the staff. With a baseline in which foundations provide an overwhelming
share of worker center budgets in most cases, increasing membership would alter
the governance trajectory of organizations. In particular, both a national network
and a stand-alone organization projected that membership dues might pay for
organizing staff, who are an essential element of their programs and are not
always fully supported by foundations focused on more immediate outputs.117
Robert, an organizer, talked both about the logistical challenges of collecting
small dues amounts from workers every month in a shelved membership scheme
and the spontaneous contributions made by workers to pay for food at worker
meetings in the midst of an active campaign:
They’re gonna invest in something that they see value and it’s not gonna be a huge
amount of money, but it’s not gonna be tiny. I think we could do more like $20 a month
even with low wage workers. I’ve talked to folks and they’re like, “Oh I could do that.
It’s worth it.

There was mixed feedback on what membership might mean in governance.
For Ruben’s organization, membership implied active participation in organizing
rather than passive receipt of services. But that did not necessarily translate into
decision-making authority within the organization. Members might help with
planning campaign events but do not have ultimate decision-making authority
over allocation of organizational budget, campaign targets, or selection of policy
initiatives. In that organization, paid staff make most of those types of decisions,
with tacit approval given by the nonprofit board.
A national network is working on developing a membership model in the
context of an extended affiliate structure. On the one hand, Jennifer and Paula
said, the organization hopes to follow a model developed by one of its older and
more established affiliates in creating opportunities for workers to organize with
others close at hand in their neighborhoods, periodically pulling these “circle[s]”
into larger local, state, and national campaigns. The organization also hopes to
deploy representational models, placing worker-members on the board of the
national organization and other state organizational nodes in the network, with
accompanying attention paid to financial literacy and other capacities. At the
same time, the network is working to transition from an affiliate structure toward
a more membership driven organization. One idea is to create a two-tiered
affiliate structure in which local organizations that set a higher floor for member
leadership and engagement have more power within the network, while other
affiliates that focus more on service provision or social enterprise with less
leadership development resources are placed on a lower tier.
Membership in a worker center is an especially interesting possibility,
perhaps less for financial sustainability—though it may free up important but
underfunded components of an organization’s program—and more as a means
by which to cope with contingent work in non-unionized workplaces. Robert
117. Marianne, Robert, Jennifer and Paula all identified this.
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articulated this vision: “[H]aving a lot of workers, having cadre of workers . . .
who are in action. Who are not majorities, who are not necessarily represented
by a union or by us or anyone, but are members . . . paying in and participating
in our activities.” While there is potential for accentuating worker voice and
autonomy through membership, it appears that the models remain more
hypothetical than actual at this time. But the inquiry and varied responses across
sectoral contexts is quite rich.
6. Identity and Experience
Worker centers aimed to organize those who labored in conditions of
contingency and inequality—racial, gendered, lingual, and by citizenship status.
The organizations sought to develop worker voice and autonomy in their unequal
workplaces. In some cases, the worker centers themselves became microcosms in
which workers developed the capacities needed to navigate difficult conditions
of work. This was particularly the case for the domestic worker organizations that
we examined through leadership interviews. Paid staff and leadership of those
organizations are nearly exclusively women of color. The coincident conditions
of exploitation and care in the industry inform organizational goals and practices,
as Jennifer and Paula explained:
Most of the people in the domestic workers industry are women of color, and so we’re
representing, and we also see domestic work itself . . . both occurs where people
experience a lot of inequality and also have to have a lot of care . . . . And so that’s really
built into the organization, and when people come in, we get that immediately, that
we’re trying to fight inequality and the way that we’re doing that is leaning in on the
compassion that’s necessary in the industry that’s needed more in the movement, and
to do that, we have to show that to ourselves and to each other.

The focus on personal and cultural transformation in the domestic worker
organizations reflect this recognition. The experiments in worker governance in
this sector also reflect the deep commitment to the development of voice and
autonomy.
In some cases, as both Hanna and Robert noted, women build autonomous
projects within larger organizations, which may be an indication of the need to
create an organizing space of their own, free of the presumptions of the nonprofit
form or the patriarchal hierarchies that may be inherent in mixed gender
contexts. Men who are day laborers accompany women who are domestic
workers on lobbying visits but, said Hanna, do not hold positions of leadership
within their organizations or have sway over policy priorities and decisionmaking. Organizations create space for autonomous decision-making by workers
marginalized in other contexts.
The maturity and prior experience of workers help form organizing initiatives
and shape worker centers. As Robert said, “you need the young people to light a
fire and have a fight, but you need the older people to build the structure.” Some
of the older workers, Hanna explained, have experience engaging in
sophisticated organizing drives in their countries of origin. The intergenerational
nature of some worker centers offers sustenance and stability.
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Finally, because of the recognition of the political and economic inequality in
society, worker centers have elevated issues and solidarities that might have been
ignored in other spaces. The commitment to raising standards in a sector is
matched with social movements focused on other issues, such as immigration
enforcement and police violence against men and women of color. According to
Jennifer and Paula, a pair of organizers, “we try to intersect a lot of identities”
and their “focus was on interdependence.”
D. Governance Experimentalism
Worker center leaders uniformly see worker involvement in governance as
both intrinsically valuable and instrumentally useful to build worker power. As
Marianne said, the organization tries to incorporate workers in decision-making
“when there are important strategic decisions, that really determine[] the future
of the organization” and the organization always tries “to engage their worker
leaders or members.”118 Although all agree worker involvement is crucial, there
are varying degrees of integration of worker voice in organizational and
campaign decision-making and sometimes a gap between intention and
practice.119 We identified four general ways in which worker centers strive to
implement their deep and unifying commitment to embed worker governance
structures in organizations and campaigns.
1. Worker Membership on Organization Boards
State and federal law governing nonprofit organizations require governance
by a board of directors. A number of the worker center leaders we interviewed
reported that their organization has worker representatives on the board so that
the board’s deliberations are informed by the involvement of people who are
experiencing directly the working conditions in the sector. Hanna described one
affiliate organization as having “a mixed board, that has both external board
members and member leaders.” Ruben explained that a local worker center
decides to invite workers to join the board based on whether “they’ve shown to
have played very active and influential roles in the various workplace campaigns
and other campaigns that [the worker center] has [led].” In some cases, the
organization has specific rules for representation of workers on the board to
ensure that worker representatives are not tokens. A national organization that
has several constituent affiliates gives each affiliate two seats on the board. One
of those two is a worker representative and the other is an affiliate staff
118. Jennifer and Paula echoed this point, saying: “[s]o, I think it’s multiple levels, so I’ll start with, I
think it’s the highest levels of the organization in terms of [time], setting, organizational direction. Like
establishing and approving the sort of budget which I would say is the way that we allocate funding to
realize the work.”
119. Marianne observed: “I also think there’s a set of questions around strategy. Do we have the
vision to make that kind of change and are we taking on the kind of campaigns we should be to build the
base, build the leadership, build the capacity, the organization and win, and winning towards a larger
goal. I think there’s a whole set of strategy questions and that’s not unique to the workers center. The
unions are grappling with that. . . . There’s several different factors that contribute to the set of questions
you are asking around, where there’s a disconnect between their intentions and how it gets practiced.”
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member.120 Other organizations manifest the commitment more organically, by
recruiting the most active workers to formal leadership roles but without quotas
for worker representation. Worker representatives play a formal governance
role, represent the organization in the public sphere, and provide leadership
internally, particularly for worker leadership development functions.121 As
Jennifer and Paula described it:
[T]he board’s role is both governance as well as support. So governance being that they
ensure that we comply with legal…responsibilities as well as ensure that all of our
programs, campaigns, initiatives are aligned with our mission and values. And then, it
might sort of approve our budget, accordingly. Support is that they are spokespeople
for the organization. They work with the staff, around the programs and initiatives.
They all donate to the organization and support fundraising activities, as well. So that
and support the Executive Director, like giving feedback, doing an annual review, help
in thinking about professional development.

Organizations are experimenting with how representation on a 501(c)(3)
board might work: Jennifer and Paula, leaders of an organization aspiring to have
mass membership in its sector, said the organization is considering elections for
worker representatives by region or by occupational category. However, they
added, leaders are concerned about moving the structure “ahead of where the
work and organizing [is].”
The concern with aligning structure with the current state of organizing is
shared by worker center leaders across sectors. In its most successful form,
worker membership on the board of directors is supported by the professional
development of those worker-members on the larger strategy questions being
confronted in the sector; the professional development training also is intended,
as Jennifer and Paula explained, to “develop skills around reading spreadsheets
and understanding budgets.” The non-worker board members are expected to
assist in this professional development function.
So far, this effort to induct worker-members into organizational governance
functions has not pulled them away the front lines in the sector, as appears to
have occurred in some unions. As Jennifer and Paula said: “So that’s actually less
of an issue for us. I think there’s just not as many opportunities. And that’s one
of our goals is to kind of continually lift up the workforce, professionalize and
have people have more opportunities.” For better or for worse, in Jennifer and
Paula’s industry, workers continue to labor in low-wage jobs, even as the
organization offers professional development and leadership opportunities.
Some leaders consider it a success when a member leader is able to move out of
working in the sector and into a position as an organizer because then, as Jennifer
and Paula put it, “their main role” can be “building contact and connection with
more” workers in the sector and “bringing them into the organization.”
Organizational leaders take pains to instill in worker-members, Jennifer and

120. Hanna, Jennifer, and Paula described a similar structure for different organizations.
121. Ruben explained that “a lot of the board of director[s] . . . members, the worker members, lead
those workshops, those leadership workshops that they hold.”
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Paula said, “a sense of responsibility and accountability . . . to the rest of the base
and to other workers.”
In other cases, worker centers have ended experiments with representation
on 501(c)(3) boards or avoided such representation. Robert said such
experiments may be “well-intentioned, not necessarily planned out well, then it
just goes to hell.”122 Robert explained that a single worker representative of a
workers’ committee on the board became a conduit for grievances; the board
stopped attending to its other business in this period, until the organization was
reconfigured. There were conduits for worker voice but conflicts were impeding
organizational development and sustainability. For another worker center that
Robert was involved with, holding on to worker-members of the board was a
challenge. The workers were interested in conversations about their workplaces
and organizing, less so about the organizational governance issues that 501(c)(3)
board have an obligation to consider. Further, linguistic differences and the need
for interpretation during board meetings has impeded the functioning of the
board, as has the difficulty for workers of managing to get to board meetings after
a long day of work. Worker voice on the board, Robert explained, needs to be
“not just individual workers, but . . . a structure . . . where the workers have a
direct” voice in organizational governance. That worker center is actively
searching for structures that will sustainably facilitate worker voice and be
responsive to workers’ concerns, while leaving conventional 501(c)(3) matters to
a board composed of staff leadership, community members, and union allies. As
Robert said, “[I]f we’re gonna do this, let’s not just be symbolic about it, let’s
actually like make it work.”
2. Workers on Campaign Committees
There is a nearly universal commitment amongst worker centers to worker
leadership of campaign formations, either focused on conditions at a particular
workplace or on policy reforms.123 This type of embedded worker governance
performs at least four functions. First, a clear commitment to campaign
participation and leadership signals to new arrivals that the worker center is not
primarily a service provider. At one worker center, after a worker has gone
through a traditional intake process about their workplace issue, the discussion

122. Robert continued: “Again, the men are doing stuff as a collective related to their work, so they
maintain a minimum wage from the center. They engage with the guys who are not engaged with the
center, who are trying to pick off work. They engage with the employers, they back each other up. That’s
all similar to a WWRC where we have structure where on the workplace side, they are organized, but in
terms of how they engage with the Center, it’s not where it should be, we think. But also same story, but
even more like, ‘[i]t went really bad for a while there, and so before we go back to it we wanna make sure
we’re doing it right.’ ‘Cause it was actively just causing heat and trauma, so it’s . . . I don’t know if you’ve
already talked to a lot of people, but you might have heard that story many times and you probably will.
But well-intentioned, not necessarily planned out well, then it just goes to hell.”
123. Jennifer and Paula phrased it this way: “[E]very campaign is a little different, but all of our
campaigns have either sort of a[n] affiliate committee where there’s both domestic workers, there’s also
organizers that get on regular calls that give input and feedback and some even set strategy and make
decisions around tactics.”
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turns to how they might help constitute a campaign strategy with other workers
to solve the problem. The goal, explained Ruben, is not merely to educate the
workers “on your basic rights” under the law, but also to initiate “a conversation
with the worker to see how the organization and the worker can start
campaigning on its behalf. And the idea is that it would include other workers
from the workplace or from the worker center, media contacts, clergy, that sort
of thing to start—so a process.” This turn toward non-litigation and
collectivization of a workplace problem is a well-worn strategy of worker centers
dating back to the earliest exemplar organizations.124
Second, organizations draw on critical knowledge that only workers possess.
They engage workers in discussion about how to build their power. As Ruben
said:
I used to be a union lawyer and I did all the talking for everyone. And so here, so when
we met the employer, the idea was that we would prepare the worker enough that the
worker started the conversation with the employer about the wages owed and what not
so that worker felt empowered, and the worker felt that it was their campaign.

Engaging workers in discussion is necessary to develop facts and identify legal
violations, to develop approaches to fellow workers subject to the same
conditions, and to develop tactics to begin to ameliorate the effects of
overwhelming employer power and worker vulnerability.125 Organizations turn
to workers to set campaign goals, from immediate action to a far time horizon
across the industry in which they work.
Third, worker centers build mechanisms by which to remain accountable to
workers in contexts in which there is a greater threat of organizational drift or
corruption. For example, Jennifer and Paula said their national worker center
network is building a worker council to exercise judgment with regard to
proposed partnerships with private sector and nonprofit service provision
entities. Worker centers engaged in policy campaigns draw on worker leadership
to ensure that the organization remains, as Ruben put it, true to its mission in
contexts in which compromises with state actors are unavoidable. Worker
leadership ensures that staff do not become detached from the actual or imagined
base of the organization. Worker-based accountability is not inevitable but
requires careful leadership development and a pervasive commitment to
underlying values. Worker leadership of campaigns, together with a concerted
focus on the development of worker capacity and an anchoring in social justice
values points organizations toward greater base accountability.

124. See supra note 12.
125. Robert concurred, explaining: “Most of our work is done in the context of campaigns. . . . A
campaign of a group of workers in a specific workplace, organizing to change their conditions. And so,
that’s where I think most of the worker accountability occurs, is that those workers as committees make
decisions about the plans around their campaigns, around the strategies. That’s where we’ve been able
to engage workers and not just when are we gonna do the delegation kinda conversations, but what is the
next step conversations around what we’re trying to build toward, what kinds of goals we’re trying to get
accomplished, and how we’re gonna get there?”
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Fourth, campaign leadership strengthens relationships between staff and
workers and offers an opportunity for workers to test their interest in broader
leadership within the organization. It is a first screen for both workers and staff
to identify new organizational leadership. This screening function can be
formalized; one worker center is contemplating bringing together two or three
workers from each of its campaigns to constitute a worker leadership group that
is less focused on internal governance functions and more on cross-fertilization
of power-building strategies and goal setting within the sector. This is particularly
significant for Robert’s organization because it is trying to organize workers at
multiple different jobsites and, Robert reported, it is using the committee to build
connections among them. Workers can share lessons from their organizing while
also being drawn into broader discussions about how to develop power across the
sector. It can, as Robert said, move the organizing discussions from the particular
level of “Hey, what’re you guys up to? What worked for you?” to “building up
to, ‘Okay, how do we actually get to a coherent industry-wide message and
strategy, because that’s really where we’d like to get.’”
Worker participation and leadership in campaign activities appears to be a
bedrock commitment of worker centers driven both by organizational values and
aspirations, as well as by necessity due to lean staffing.126
3. Leadership Development and Personal Transformation
Board membership and campaign participation can be forms of leadership
development. Some worker centers have developed more formal approaches;
others rely on organic efforts that develop worker capacity over time. As Robert
said:
[W]e haven’t just told them what to do but we’ve engaged them. We’ve invited them to
trainings. We’ve done a lot of direct involvement. We’ve brought workers on house
visits to push each other and pull other people in. But it’s just the basics of organizing.
And it’s really [a co-director] organizing that group to be able to hold their co-workers
accountable.

Ruben explained that worker involvement is an effective communications
strategy and a form of leadership development: “If they are having just a press
conference about whatever campaign, they make sure that they bring members
from the organization to be there, present and they can speak to the press,
because it’s always preferable to have them speak than somebody like me.” One
particularly intentional national network of worker centers emphasizes personal
transformation in its fellowship program for prospective worker-leaders.
Marianne described a set of questions that connect personal transformation with
organizing and leadership development goals: How might workers’ life
experiences have inhibited their leadership potential? How do they share their
experiences with other workers, both within and outside of their sector? How
does personal transformation lead to social transformation? The perspective of

126. See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 19, at 1227 (discussing members on “transitory teams” led by
staff).
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organizers in asking these questions is rooted in an understanding that legal
change may be necessary but not sufficient in creating changed conditions of
work in their sector.127 As Jennifer and Paula explained, “if we just changed how
the labor standards were applied in our industry but then people still devalued
[the workers], then that’s not a victory for us.” Jennifer, Paula, and Marianne
noted that workers may have to overcome forms of trauma—from experiences in
their country of origin, from their migration to the United States, or from their
experiences in this country—before exercising agency and leadership.128 By
focusing on individual transformation, organizers hope, as Jennifer and Paula put
it, that they can ultimately enable “people [to] take seriously that they’re
representing many workers, and many organizations, and many people” beyond
themselves.129 Before they can take on the responsibility of collective solidarity,
they must overcome their own internal constraints.
The aspiration for deeper democratic engagement relies on an organization’s
investment in the capacity of workers to weigh in on strategic decisions and
organizational development. As Jennifer and Paula explained:
[T]his question of democracy and sort of worker-led organizations, it’s a process, so
we’ve created these statures and structures within the organization to really provide sort
of a[n] opportunity for development and then for decision-making and input. And the
reality is it’s a process, and then they’re really building the capacity in the ability of
workers themselves to make these decisions. And so, part of having that process sort of
be successful and continually moving towards, I think, a more democratic structure is
really investing in their leadership and in their capacity to make decisions on strategy
and in an organizational direction.130

It is, Jennifer and Paula continued, a slow process:
It’s something that we’ll have to invest in for many years, but . . . And then the quality
of leadership at the board level, at the director’s cohort, and then within each of these
program . . . or in the fellowship, you can see just how people are able to both bring
their personal experience as workers, and then also to get them at the larger social,
political, and economic levels.

However, as we discuss more fully in Part III.C., the sector context may
determine the scope of possibility for leadership development in worker centers.
According to Steven, a lawyer who has worked with numerous worker centers:
127. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997)(on “culture-shifting” through law).
128. Jennifer and Paula said: “Even in our leadership development program, we’re talking to people
about the things that have happened in their lives and how that can limit them as leaders, and then what
pairings they need to engage in on an individual level and a collective level so we can all just lead better.”
Marianne phrased it slightly differently: “I would say that . . . they actually have made a structural choice,
so they have a program . . . really to engage members from their affiliates, and I think some staff are
involved too, but really engage them in political education, leadership development, skills training for
them to be good organizers, and really tryin’ to connect what they do as an organizer, as a worker . . . .
Like connected to their personal trauma and the healing, and so they engage in somatics practice. So I
think there’s a real effort [the organization] is making to broaden the base of leadership that it goes
beyond paid staff.”
129. Marianne also made this point.
130. See POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 7 (“In the organizations that I studied, I was struck by
participants’ emphasis on deliberative talk. . . . [T]he goal was not unanimity so much as discourse. But it
was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect.”).
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“If you put more resources into leadership development, you maybe move more
slowly; if you’re trying to move fast for policy changes against well-resourced
opposition, leadership development is different. And you look for a different set
of people and skills.”
4. Political Education
Worker centers engage in at least three forms of political education of their
members and staff. First, organizations teach workers how to engage in politics:
the push and pull of interest groups in making laws through legislative and
administrative processes.131 A state-based sectoral network of worker centers
prepares what Hanna called “facilitation guides” for discussion amongst workers
at the affiliate organizational level. The guides discuss the concerns of elected
officials and other factors that determine outcomes in the policy-making process.
As Hanna explained, the process is so that “[t]hey don’t just present an idea, they
train workers to understand the context to a decision that has to be made,
questions around political strategy and political context.” The goal is to build
consensus within organizations and then across the network for the how it will
approach choices and decisions in the policy-making process, and then the
consensus decision can be reported back up to the state level organization. The
state-based network also uses this kind of process to do strategic planning and
organizational development work across the affiliates. In Hanna’s words, “[i]t’s
not an agile infrastructure, those bigger lift decisions where we really touch back
with the membership, it takes maybe two months, to . . . [m]aybe a month, we
could do it.”
Second, organizations teach workers about the political: thinking about the
forces in conflict in their sector and across the economy.132 The aspiration is to
offer staff and workers the capacity to develop their own political analysis.133
Nearly all national networks of worker centers have annual assemblies of workerleaders, at which both politics and the political are discussed and debated across
organizational and geographic bounds.134
Third, organizations engaged in funded worker education programs extend
those discussions to focus on how to change debilitating conditions of work. For
example, Robert explained, his worker center receives small amounts of funding
to provide health and safety training for workers. Organizers pivot midway
through the workshop to focus on how to challenge conditions while remaining

131. CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL 8–34 (2005).
132. MOUFFE, supra note 131.
133. As Jennifer and Paula put it, “And we got on an organizational level, we incorporate a lot of
both the political analysis that we have of what’s happening in the broader society and then when it’s
focused on what’s happening in the care industry, and we do that pretty regularly. So as we do it in our
staff retreats, we also have staff that meet together every month. So there’s a way in which we’re helping
to create that ability for the whole staff to participate in analysis and strategy, but not just purely focus
on our sector or just domestic workers. So I think that’s one way that we’re trying to view that culture.”
134. Marianne reported that her own organization does this and that various other organizations do
too.
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employed. There is a broad understanding of how employers may be abusing
their power. As Robert explained: “[T]hat’s always the thing, [the] workers know
generally when they’re getting screwed. The problem is, how do you move that
to action without getting fired?” Robert continued, explaining that laws that are
supposed to protect workers against retaliation for challenging illegal employer
practices aren’t often enforced:
[E]veryone knows that if you speak up about a problem, even if you’re on the right side
of the law, you’re still fucked. That’s…where you have the conversation about, “Okay,
what are we gonna do to do this and not get fired? How do we do this collectively? How
do we do it to whatever?” Get press involved. That’s a conversation you have to tack
on there, but it takes more time and it takes more resources. And that’s the constant
struggle that we have as a worker center.”

Organizers struggle to make this pivot in the context of otherwise formal and
formulaic educational programs.
5. Worker Autonomy
A final form of embedded worker governance in this organizational context
is an aspiration and preparation for worker autonomy. One worker center
operating with a very lean staff in an immense and growing non-unionized sector
of the economy is particularly focused on how to prepare groups of workers to
exercise power at their workplaces, ultimately independently of organizational
staff. Its organizer, Robert, explained:
The workers that are taking action on their own without checking with us, they’re just
doing it and then telling us later. Not necessarily strikes, but delegations, running
petitions, we haven’t been staffing as much as we used to, and so, they actually are
running their own meetings, convening in regular basis with us or without us, but that’s
because they’ve been doing it for a while.

This works, the organizer explained, because they have experience through
the center’s organizing activities: “if they tried this three years ago, it wouldn’t
have happened.” The worker center does not have the capacity or the access to
educate, support, and protect workers at numerous work settings in the region in
which it operates, so autonomy and taking the initiative has “been forced on
them.” Robert explained that the shortage of staff at the center has, in some
sense, been good for the workers:
But it’s always a lot easier for them to just say, “Oh, you guys do it.” Right? [chuckle]
Now we’re like, “No, we can’t do it man. It’s on you.” It’s actually forced us to do that.
. . .I’m not quite sure what would happen if we pull back entirely, but I think a lot of the
activities that they’re taking is, when it’s hot they’ll call heat break. We have nothing do
with that. And they don’t have their phones inside [the workplace]. They can’t
communicate with us. They’re just like, “No, we’re doing it.” Or if there’s a forklift
that’s brakes are a problem and it’s dangerous, they’ll call it out and say, “Hey, that
machine needs to be taken out of service.” That stuff happens more than you think, but
now that they’re more organized it happens even more.

The lack of worker center resources means that workers must take it upon
themselves to run meetings, make demands, formulate petitions, and call work
stoppages. The focus of domestic worker organizations on personal
transformation discussed above is analogous to this aspiration for the
transformation of groups of workers in larger workplaces with hundreds or
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thousands of workers on site. The goal of the organizing is to help workers
understand what constraints hold groups of workers from acting in concert. Does
the group have a strategic vision that it hopes to achieve in a workplace? Is the
group linked to other groups of workers in similar workplaces? How can positive
lessons in organizing be transmitted across groups? A leader at this worker center
posited that this kind of autonomy was already in operation at many workplaces.
The goal of organizers was to invest in groups of workers and make connections
to struggles in other workplaces.
A second context in which the exercise of worker autonomy is essential is in
litigation when the worker center is not a party. As Robert said:
[W]e don’t have attorneys on staff, we’re not the party. We can recommend and often
when you get to the point of the settlement, these guys have been involved with a lawsuit
for several years, guys and gals, they’ve been involved and been the face of the
organization for the lawsuit for several years. It’s not just [the worker center that] says,
“Settle,” and they do it . . . . If our relationship is good, they listen and we have a
conversation.

Workers need to make decisions about the conduct of litigation and in judging
whether to settle cases or to continue to fight. The lawyer-client relationship pulls
workers away from organizers.135 Workers in these contexts may be called on to
defy the pressures of their own immediate need or that of other workers to
sustain deeper and longer-term shifts in their conditions of work. Worker centers
invest in groups of workers entering into litigation with the understanding that
they will not ultimately have a decision-making role in most forms of litigation or
administrative adjudication. This is an essential and time-intensive function of
worker centers with uncertain outcomes.
IV.
UNIONS AND WORKER CENTERS: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES
For reasons of size and budget, worker centers—whether local or national—
are, at the moment, not at risk of creating a genuine bureaucracy. The democracy
and accountability problems that bureaucracy entails and that have shaped half
a century of criticism of labor unions are, therefore, not yet a substantial concern.
The field, however, is dynamic and we seek to understand the trajectories of
organizations as much as their current constitution. Accordingly, this part
compares worker centers to unions with respect to four crucial characteristics of
social movement organizations: (1) the mobilization and training of workers to
engage in effective campaigns; (2) the relations between the professional staff
and the worker members; (3) the balance of power between local groups and the
national organization of which they are affiliates; and (4) the prospects for
developing a self-sustaining funding model.

135. Ashar, supra note 92, at 1894–95.
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A. Mobilization and Training of Worker Leaders
One of the most significant features of all the organizations we studied is that
all count on intense member engagement to conduct their campaigns. That is not
surprising about, and indeed is a well-known feature of, worker centers that focus
on organizing workers in a particular community and pressuring individual
employers to change certain policies. Thus, Robert, a leader of a local worker
center in the warehouse industry, noted that the organization is a
[P]retty traditional non-profit organization. We have a board of directors . . . . We have
. . . co-directors. We report to the Board of Directors, which is a group of folks who are
community members, union leaders. We do not have any current or former . . . workers
[in the industry they are trying to organize] on our board, at different points we’ve had
. . . workers, but it’s been really hard to hang on to and keep them engaged on the board
level[.]

In describing the way workers are involved, Robert explained:
So this is something we’ve struggled with over the years and had long conversations and
attempts. We don’t have a membership structure currently. We’re looking into what
that would look like. Most of our work is done in the context of campaigns. . . . A
campaign of a group of workers in a specific workplace, organizing to change their
conditions. And so, that’s where I think most of the worker accountability occurs, is that
those workers as committees make decisions about the plans around their campaigns,
around the strategies. That’s where we’ve been able to engage workers. [A]nd not just
“when are we gonna do the delegation?” kinda conversations, but, “what is the next
step?” conversations around what we’re trying to build toward, what kinds of goals
we’re trying to get accomplished, and how we’re gonna get there.

But the structures to elicit and maintain intense member engagement exist
even among organizations that are focused on state-wide or national legal policy
campaigns and legislative change. Hanna, a statewide leader of an alliance of
seven organizations each rooted in a distinct community within the same sector,
explained:
We have a document, like a living document that is adjusted year by year, that stipulates
the infrastructure for our coalition, the staffing structure, as well as the decision-making
structure, how work is carried by different organizations. And in terms of leadership
and decision-making, that is vested in the seven organizations of the steering committee
and decisions are aimed to be made by consensus. And when they’re not, they’re made
by a majority vote since it’s an odd number. And the other requirement we have had is
that the representatives . . . that sit on our steering committee that makes decisions
about our work have to include . . . members from the base in order for those decisions
to be made. We built into the structure—and this became really important during our
legislative campaign . . . — when there was decisions made about amendments, even,
amendments to the bill, shifts in the bill content, all of that had to be approved by the
steering committee.

Hanna added that when the organization is engaging in strategic planning, or
deciding on what legislation the organization should seek to have enacted, “we
have this kind of feedback loop infrastructure . . . [by which] the different worker
centers . . . go . . . to their general membership.”
To make member engagement work as a form of decision-making and
strategic planning, it is necessary to educate workers about the issues and the
political context. That is a resource-intensive and time-consuming process. Thus,
in describing the way that affiliates of the alliance of seven affiliated
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organizations described immediately above engage the membership in strategic
planning, Hanna explained:
They don’t just present an idea, they train workers to understand the context to a
decision that has to be made, questions around political strategy and political context.
And then they build consensus among their membership and then take that consensus
and that’s what [is] brought into decision making in the coalition.

Unions have long struggled with the same kinds of challenges and some have
employed similar processes that balance member engagement at the local level
with efficient decision-making at quadrennial national conventions. It is not
feasible in this article to exhaustively compare and contrast the decision-making
structures of worker centers and unions. It suffices to note for present purposes
that both types of organizations have to work to balance member engagement in
decision-making against the need to be responsive to fast-moving events. Both
rely on professional staff to make a great many decisions.
B. The Development of Professional Staff Divorced from Worker Members
One of the old concerns about union democracy, going back to the 1950s at
least, was that unions tended to become oligarchical because it was too hard for
someone who once worked in the industry to learn and adapt to the very
different—and often more respected and less physically demanding—job of
being a union leader for just the term of years in office and then leave office and
go back to working in a factory.136 Just as unions in the 1930s and 1940s envisioned
eliminating this difficulty by training factory workers to be permanent union
organizers or union stewards (at least part time), worker centers think of training
members to become organizers by profession. The goal, as Marianne, a leader of
a national organization of domestic workers, explained, is to:
[R]eally engage [the workers] in political education, leadership development, skills
training for them to be good organizers, and really tryin’ to connect what they do as an
organizer, as a worker, is . . . [l]ike connected to their personal trauma and the healing,
and so they engage in somatics practice. So I think there’s a real effort [our organization]
is making to broaden the base of leadership that it goes beyond [paid] staff.

The first step is often to work as a volunteer part-time worker-leader, and
then perhaps as part-time worker center staff, either while still working in the
occupation or while working on staff of the worker center or another one like it,
and perhaps finally as a professional full-time staffer. Marianne explained the
difference:
I met some of [a national worker organization’s] members who are in leadership
role[s], but they haven’t transitioned into staff, so they’re still working in the industry. .
. . I’ve also seen where they’re splitting time. They’re still working [in the industry], but

136. LIPSET, TROW & COLEMAN, supra note 18. This was also, to some extent, an accomplishment
of the United Farm Workers – to train farm workers to become organizers so that they would never again
have to work in the fields. FRANK BARDACKE, TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE: CESAR CHAVEZ AND
THE TWO SOULS OF THE UNITED FARM WORKERS 314 (2011) (“Having experienced the joy of politics,
most of the farm workers [who were involved in organizing the nationwide grape boycott in 1968] swore
they would never work in the fields again – although Fred Ross, who was in charge of training the
boycotters, admonished them not to say that publicly.”).
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also working at [the organization] as a staff person. But the attempt is . . . [f]or them to
become full-time paid organizers. . . .
I think this is where the organizing strategy is different, and again, not in any way
[a] critique of the unions, but my understanding of the worker center as a broader
movement strategy is really lead with base building, so part of the work as an organizer
is . . . . And they’re running campaigns, and part of the campaign work has to be base
building. So I think that the transition of you’re working on a factory floor one day, and
now you’re in an office somewhere in the city, and maybe engaged in contract
negotiation, that comparison isn’t—[i]t’s not easily transferable or applicable in the
worker center.

All interviewed worker group leaders are quite intentional in their efforts to
prevent a division from arising between the professional staff and the
membership. As Jennifer and Paula explained, the evolution in the board
structure of her organization was intended to ensure that worker members retain
power in the national board. In the beginning, the national organization was
simply an affiliation of local groups and “didn’t have its own 501(c)(3), and so
there was a steering committee of all affiliates. Each affiliate organization being
represented by staff as well as a worker.” As described above, each of the six
affiliates represented on the national board are represented by two people: a
staffer and a worker member. When asked specifically whether it is difficult for
workers who have been part of the national board to continue to work in the field
in their occupation, Jennifer and Paula said:
So that’s actually less of an issue for us. […] ’’’’I will say that one thing we’ve seen
is some of our domestic worker leaders do get on staff of some of the organizations,
either part-time or full-time, to become organizers with their main role being building
contact and connection with more domestic workers and bringing them into the
organization.
And what’s been important in continuing them holding sort of the values is that
as we develop organizers, . . . we really kinda integrate a sense of responsibility and
accountability to what that means, in particular to the rest of the base and to other
workers. . . . Most of them continue to be part of the workforce and do most of their
work as volunteers either in their organization or with [our organization]. . . . I do think
that one thing that I would add—and I don’t know that this is something that would
safeguard us from that [oligarchy] or not—but I do feel like one of the kind of core
values of [our organization] and what people consistently say why they are part of the
alliance is because we built in a lot of care, a lot of connections, a lot of resilience.

Yet most leaders to whom we spoke recognize that creating structures that
will keep the organization accountable to its members is an ongoing project. As
Robert, a leader of a local organization, said: “all in all we basically have like a
traditional nonprofit structure, and don’t have a lot of real clear accountability
from the workers.” That is not to say the organization is not accountable at all,
just that the accountability is not “real clear” and is not inherent in the structure.
Jennifer and Paula, leaders of a national organization, explained:
Yeah, there’s a lot of learning, a lot of experimentation on how to use these different
structures in order to achieve transparency and democracy, and leadership,
accountability. And I think we’re all trying to figure it out and it’s really just a process,
but I wouldn’t say that we have it figured out completely.
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C. Power of Local Affiliates Versus Power of National Organization
The history of labor union democracy has a featured lively debate over
whether unions should be more centralized or less so. Though some of that
debate lost its edge as unions lost power, it surfaced with the usual vigor (and the
all-too-common recriminations) when the SEIU restructured its historically quite
autonomous local unions in the early 2000s. SEIU created larger locals that could
engage in sectoral bargaining on a regional or statewide basis to counter the
growing consolidation of power among ever-larger health care corporations, but
critics worried that it consolidated power in the professional leadership at the
expense of grassroots activists.137
The challenge of preserving the power of local affiliates while engaging in a
nationwide campaign against a nationwide business organization exists for some
worker centers as well. A leader of one nationwide worker center, and another
person involved in the same organization from the early years, both said the
structure of the worker center evolved because of the need for national
coordination. As with unions, the organization reduced the autonomy of chapters
in particular cities that formerly had been linked mainly by affiliation agreements
in order to concentrate organizational power in the national organization to
counter the power of the major national business association. As Steven said, the
fact that the workers confronted “a very resourced, unified opposition” was “a
significant factor in pushing [the worker center] to have a single organization to
respond or to attack or whatever.” Henry, a seasoned scholar-activist who has
studied and been involved with many worker centers, explained in contrasting
worker organizations in the restaurant, domestic work, and day labor sectors,
“the industry make-up . . . influences the way they do decision-making and the
way they approach strategic decisions.” In economic sectors—such as domestic
work—that are not dominated by large nationwide corporations and their
powerful lobbying organization, the tendency is to have a national federation of
worker centers to engage in policy advocacy but the alliance is looser and more
of the funding and policymaking power is held in the local organizations.
The federal structure of worker centers is also, in some cases, influenced by
the determination of the opposition to engage in an affirmative campaign to
destroy the workers’ organization. As the scholar-activist Henry explained,
whether the organization and its leadership are “under attack” and the target of
“attempts to destroy the organization” influences how the organization’s leaders
and members can debate “what we can do to move forward and how to
strategically—what makes sense, what doesn’t make sense—to address important
issues.” In contrast, explained Steven, reflecting on his involvement in several
worker centers, a national federation of predominantly local organizations is
possible when a worker center “has no adversary. Nobody’s opposed. And
there’s no economic interest [being] challenged.”
137. An insightful analysis of the issues, including a discussion of the particular case of the SEIUUHW dispute, is Matthew Dimick, Revitalizing Union Democracy: Labor Law, Bureaucracy, and
Workplace Association, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010).
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Another reason that some worker center national organizations are
affiliations of local groups, in which the local group is the primary locus of
activity, rather than national groups in which the national organization is the
dominant actor, has to do with the historical development of the organizations.
As Steven explained about one national federation of worker centers:
[T]he locals existed first. They were . . . worker organizations [that] grew up in New
York and San Francisco, and at least half a dozen, maybe more, other cities. And then
they gathered together within one of the U.S. social forums ten years ago or whatever
and formed the national organization out of that. The structure of the board, the
national board . . . , partly [is] a result of the history.

However, Steven immediately qualified the statement about history by
continuing:
I think also a different priority and building local leadership and local strengths and
democracy internally, but also not having any external pressure. They have a board
where most of the members represent chapters . . . or the locals . . . [or their] component
organizations. . . . So, really, the chapters are on the board for so many years. And actual
people sitting on the board are there—sent by the chapters—and the chapter could
switch who their representative is. It’s a very interesting structure.

Jennifer and Paula, leaders of the same organization described by Steven,
explained that the national organization was not originally a separate legal entity
but was instead a steering committee composed of representatives of the
affiliates. That national steering committee “always held that level of decisionmaking authority in the organization.” When the national organization became a
§ 501(c)(3) organization, the steering committee became the board of directors,
and the composition of the board changed slightly but continued to give affiliates
and workers a majority vote on the board.
Many interviewees noted the constant challenge of maintaining autonomy
and power at the local level while enabling national or regional coordination and
accountability to an oversight organization like a board of directors. Henry, a
former leader of a local nonprofit that was the institutional home of a worker
center and organizing project, explained the tension between accountability to
the workers and accountability to the board of directors
One of the challenges I had . . . because [my organizer] would always push me to become
more independent of the decision-making above me. Because [of] the worker centers,
he wanted to have his own model of his whole strategy with the [workers], his own
independence, which makes sense because it’s what the workers wanted. . . . I was
caught right smack in the middle of this, because then I also had to be accountable to
[the nonprofit’s] leadership, [to] my executive director, and also the Board of Directors.
So I always found myself trying to find this checks and balances approach, make sure I
keep [my organizer independent] to develop his strategy for . . . organizing for the
worker centers. And then I had to figure out how to translate that strategy into
something that was acceptable for the people above me.

When asked how the interests of the two groups diverged, Henry identified
institutional control or credit and also resources:
I think we were all on the same page of promoting the leadership and improving. [T]he
. . . people were on the same page with the leadership development and improving the
lives of the [workers]. And also putting up effective worker centers as far as providing
services and education for the workers and employment.
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But when an organizer “thought of a strategy to create a movement like
worker centers would become independent, be part of a bigger movement,” there
was “tension” because the nonprofit’s leadership “saw these worker centers as a
project of [the nonprofit] while [my organizer] and these other organizers saw
these worker centers as the creation of a movement of [workers in that sector].”
Henry continued:
You know, [the nonprofit] was a membership organization. We were trying to build our
membership, so there was always that struggle that the day laborers at the worker
centers felt that the worker center was the organization; they were members of their
worker center, and not so much of the [nonprofit].

Moreover, Henry explained, the money to operate the worker center came
from a foundation that funded the nonprofits, of which the worker center was
just one part. Two different nonprofits that housed worker centers at various
points felt like if the workers “became independent from their own movement,
that there’d be a competition with resources. . . . If it branches off on its own, then
it creates a dynamic about the resources, because then the resources should go to
the new organization since it’s no longer connected with [the nonprofit].”
D. Dependence on Foundations Rather Than Member Dues
A major difference between worker centers and labor unions, of course, is
that worker centers depend on foundation funding, not on member dues.138 The
availability of foundation funding has been crucial, according to Henry, who has
long experience in worker center organizing:
[O]ne of the biggest [developments has been] the Ford Foundation providing resources
to worker centers. . . . I think we’re going into our tenth year now of the Ford
Foundation. . . . And so the way they look at it—they see worker center networks as
labor market intermediaries. They have been leveraging important gains for workers
and working with key stakeholders, that’s how they see unions. . . . They don’t call it
organizing because the Board of Directors, they don’t do anything that’s considered
organizing. But they call it supporting worker centers to be effective labor market
intermediaries, which they are.

All of our interviewees noted that they rely heavily on foundations and
philanthropy, not on member dues. Most explained the absence of a dues model
by the very low wages workers are paid would make charging dues terribly
onerous on the workers. The small amount workers could pay, combined with
the fact that many low-wage workers have no access to banking or formal
financial services, would make the collection of dues not worth the effort. Robert
said the organization tested out a dues model a few years before but “[i]t was just
really burdensome to—even dealing with [five dollars] a month. We literally were
chasing people down for [five dollar] bills.” Robert noted that their center does
not “have a membership structure currently. We’re looking into what that would
look like. Most of our work is done in the context of campaigns.”139

138. See generally, Catherine L. Fisk, Workplace Democracy and Democratic Worker Organizations:
Notes on Worker Centers, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 101 (2016).
139. Hanna also talked about considering a dues model.
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Leaders did not perceive that the reliance on philanthropy and some
government grants to fundamentally shape the governance of the organization.
As Hanna said, “funders do not have governing say and I don’t believe that they
play a role in governance.”140 But funding can impact priorities. As Robert
explained:
There’s very little funding for organizing, and what we end up doing is getting money
for other stuff and then doing that work, and figuring out how to loop organizing into
it. There’s . . . money for policy—not a lot. There’s money for policy. There’s money for
civic engagement and voter engagement. There’s money for education. And you’d have
to figure out how to engage workers in a deeper way. And most of the time you can, if
you’re doing a training. . . .

Yet, Robert continued:
[A]s an organization that’s growing up and learning, we’re having to figure out how not
to just chase money and do whatever the foundation says, but actually engage them and
say, “Hey, this is what we do. We’re not gonna twist ourselves into knots to do what you
want us to do, ‘cause otherwise we’ll never get anything done.”

Henry, who has been involved with many different worker formations, noted
the significance of funding for the formation of the national worker center
networks. The Ford Foundation, Henry explained, funds “worker center
networks. The Ford Foundation is not going to fund individual worker center
because they also see the stuff as impact funding…. They feel like it’s more
beneficial . . . for them, [and] they get more for their dollar if they give to the
worker center networks and then the worker center networks can develop
innovative strategy. . . .”

V.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
There are at least five additional implications of our findings for how we think
about worker organizations in the contemporary U.S. The first is related to the
interaction between governance experimentalism and the types of activities
undertaken by SMOs. Does governance formalism lead to the use of more
conservative advocacy tactics? Second, is the “iron law of oligarchy” inevitable?
Third, is governance experimentalism scalable? Fourth, do organizational
democratic norms contribute to social and political democracy outside of the
organizations? Finally, fifth, how do legal regulation and funding models interact
with governance experimentalism? We offer contingent and preliminary answers
to these queries on the basis of our pilot study with leaders and affiliates of
workers centers.
A. Organizational Democracy and Advocacy Tactics
It is difficult to establish a relationship between governance experimentalism
and how confrontational or bottom-up organizational advocacy might be. First,

140. Similarly, Robert said the funders are not represented in governance.
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worker centers hew to a baseline investment in worker voice and autonomy. All
of the organizations examined in this article have worker leadership on campaign
committees and engage in political education of varying kinds. Above that
baseline, some of the organizations have workers on non-profit boards, invest
more consciously in leadership development and personal transformation, and
try to equip workers not involved in core campaigns with the capacity to stand up
to employers in far-flung workplaces. This variation appears to be caused largely
by the conditions in the sector in which a worker center operates. The relative
economic and political power of employers is a significant determinant of how
experimentalist with worker voice and autonomy a worker center can be or how
decentralized it can be. In sectors with powerful opponents, such as the National
Restaurant Association, a worker center network has to be more centralized and
project greater message discipline. It also has to self-police so as to preclude
employer attacks on its quasi-union status. Further, the profusion of less
restricted foundation resources allows for greater organizing capacity, which
translates into governance experimentalism and focus on worker voice and
autonomy. This allows the networked worker centers with support from the Ford
Foundation to have a greater capacity for governance experimentalism than
stand-alone worker centers, which need to scramble more to produce a program
that is fundable.
All of the worker centers about which we gathered information have engaged
in a range of advocacy methods, including litigation, legislative advocacy, and
direct action. They have used both top-down and bottom-up tactics. “[A]ctivists’
success usually depends on their tactical innovation.”141 Those worker centers
with powerful and unified opponents in their sectors have deployed adversarial
tactics to a greater degree than organizations in other sectors. But there doesn’t
appear to be a simple relationship between the use of confrontational tactics and
the degree of governance experimentalism in the organization.
B. Defying the “Iron Law of Oligarchy”
SMOs can resist oligarchy.142 We have collected interview data about
organizations that are all less than 20 years old. Perhaps there is further
professionalization or inevitable bureaucratization or leadership corruption in
the future of these organizations. But we saw no evidence of a widening
disinvestment in worker voice and autonomy. Some organizations exhibit a
substantial governance experimentalism. Others operate as a typical nonprofit
organization managed by staff with a modest amount of member engagement.
Those that have been more experimental in governance have been able to do so
because of the structure of the sector in which their members work. The initial

141. POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 10.
142. Staggenborg, supra note 21, at 604 (“Based on my data, I dispute the conclusion that formalized
SMOs necessarily become oligarchical. In fact, many seem more democratic than informal SMOs because
they follow routinized procedures that make it more difficult for individual leaders to attain
disproportionate power.”).

141 - BOOK PROOF - ASHAR FISK (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2019]

WORKER CENTER GOVERNANCE

8/14/2019 10:09 AM

185

social justice mission of the organizations and the commitment to a degree of
accountability to constituents remains, even in the absence of established
membership models or external legal regulation. Although size necessitates
formalization, those organizations practicing a high degree of experimentalism
have developed alternative approaches to governance challenges.143 For example,
one organization strategically allocates resources to enhance democratic norms
and assure accountability in areas of potential breach, such as legislative
compromise and social enterprise development, when individualized or thirdparty interests may undercut a commitment to collective interests. In sectors with
powerful employer interests, professionalized SMOs are no match for entrenched
antagonists;144 SMOs must engage in mass mobilizations to mount challenges to
those interests, which depend on organizational credibility and established
accountability structures, thus countering the push for centralization in such
sectors. Pragmatic concerns may reinforce a founding mission to keep democratic
norms present and vital as organizations and the fields in which they operate
evolve.
C. Scalability, Funding Models, and Union Collaborations
Preserving member engagement and developing a sustainable financial model
to allow the organizations to grow to a national scale were two of the most
common unsolved questions leaders identified. As Marianne said, “I would just
say that I think funding is a huge challenge . . . . [Worker centers] are still
grappling with what is the revenue generation strategy to sustain their
organizations.” Hanna candidly confessed, “[t]he infrastructure that we currently
have probably wouldn’t work to grow to scale.”
Everyone recognized the need to develop a self-sustaining funding
mechanism but member dues in the union style was not embraced by anyone as
the solution because of the very low wages paid to the workers whom worker
centers are organizing. Steven mentioned a union leader who had raised seed
money “to underwrite various worker centers’ efforts to build mission-consistent
revenue generating enterprises. I don’t know if anything’s gotten much off the
ground. I work with a couple that [one nationwide worker center organization] is
trying, but they’re moving very slowly.” Marianne suggested that the challenge
was not simply that workers can ill afford to pay dues, but that it’s not clear what
membership should mean: “What’s the definition of when somebody’s engaged
or when somebody’s a member? I think it also implicates a question of revenue
generation for worker centers.”

143. Id. (“My research shows that SMOs vary in the ways in which they deal with internal
organizational problems and changes in the environment. Formalization is one important means of
solving organizational problems, particularly as SMOs grow larger; however, SMOs can also develop
alternative structures.”).
144. Jenkins & Eckert, supra note 27, at 827 (“But if the goal is bringing an excluded group into the
polity, a mass movement is necessary. . . . Well-funded professional SMOs are simply no match for an
entrenched antagonist.”).
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One way in which worker centers meet the challenge of scalability is by
collaborating with labor unions. For most of the twentieth century, the term labor
organization was synonymous with labor or trade union, and virtually no worker
organization existed that was not a labor union. In the early twenty-first century,
many wonder whether worker centers will entirely eclipse labor unions, or what
role each institution will play. We suggest that envisioning labor unions and
worker centers as fundamentally different may be a mistake.
The many collaborations and partnerships between worker centers and
unions suggests that the divide between the union model of organizing and
representation and the worker center model may be narrowing. Unions fund
worker centers and collaborate or even formally affiliate with them. The carwash
campaign began on the worker center model but resulted in several car washes
being unionized. Fight for 15 was financially supported and staffed by SEIU. The
Caring Across Generations campaign is a joint project of SEIU and NDWA.
Unions support the One Fair Wage campaign of ROC to eliminate the
subminimum wage for tipped employees. And there are many affiliations.145
Equally as significant, perhaps, is that organizations are developing with
union support and are emulating the worker center model of organizing. AriseChicago is one example.146 Others include partnerships between NDLON and
construction unions in which day laborers are members of both NDLON and
LIUNA. The collaborations of worker centers and unions can result in an
organization that bargains collectively and gains enforceable contracts but that
retains the social movement and bottom-up accountability of a worker center. As
Henry explained:
In the carwash campaign—the great thing about the carwash campaign is its being led
by organizers that are more rooted in worker centers. . . . [A]nd so it’s a union model,
we do have collective bargaining, so if we can find an opportunity for collective
bargaining, we pressure them upholding to the union contract. But the majority of
workers belong to the worker center because we don’t have enough resources to
unionize every car wash. And then that worker center, they have their own decisionmaking processes separate and apart from the AFL-CIO and United Steelworkers. And
they form their own decisions. But that’s because the folks that run the campaign have
the mindset, they come from the worker center movement background.

Of course, it is still true that unions seek to represent workers for collective
bargaining and worker centers do not. And it is now and always has been true
that unions represent more than their members especially in pushing legislation
and administrative regulation to protect working conditions. For all the overlap,
the main differences remain (a) dependence on member dues versus foundations;
(b) collective bargaining and contract administration; and (c) legal regulation.
Other than actual or potential collaborations with labor unions, worker
centers’ baseline commitment to worker voice and autonomy—with workers on

145. Victor Narro, Saba Waheed & Jassmin Poyaoan, Building a Movement Together: Worker
Centers and Labor Union Affiliations (2015), available at https://www.labor.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/AFL-CIO_UCLAreportnobug_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FDJ-3LSL]
146. Both Henry and Ruben cited the case of Arise-Chicago.
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every campaign committee and sophisticated political education—ensures that
democratic norms may be scaled upward as organizations get larger and as they
influence one another in their fields of work. Further, the commitment to
intersectional struggle—allying with others on issues other than the terms and
conditions of member employment—is strong and fairly uniform. For example,
worker centers have been prominent in activism against immigration
enforcement and police violence.
These commitments are not ones that all worker advocacy or even social
justice organizations have abided by in the recent past.
D. Social and Political Democracy
A major theme in contemporary scholarship and political discussion, as noted
briefly above, is the prospect for democracy in the context of neoliberalism. The
dearth of democracy in the workplace, noted most recently by philosopher
Elizabeth Anderson147 and law professors including Cynthia Estlund,148 has
always been recognized as having dire consequences for the prospect of
democracy writ large. The Industrial Revolution, Anderson says, shattered
eighteenth century egalitarian theorists’ hope that “a free society of equals might
be built through a market society.”149 Employment in large enterprises for the
vast majority of workers after the Industrial Revolution, whether in a Ford
factory in 1930 or in McDonald’s today, was to subject oneself to a dictatorship
for most of one’s waking hours. The only real freedom the worker enjoys is to
quit. The freedom to quit is not much freedom. After all, Anderson points out,
Mussolini was no less a dictator because Italians could emigrate.150
Social democracy and labor unions, the two institutions that achieved success
and scale in combatting autocracy in politics and at work, are enjoying a new
vogue. The explicit purpose of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which
granted workers the right to unionize, was to create a more equitable political
economy and a more robust political democracy by protecting workplace
democracy.151 Shared determination of the conditions of work—what used to be
called industrial democracy—was essential to political democracy. As the
statute’s principal sponsor, Robert Wagner believed, those who “know the

147. ANDERSON, supra note 11.
148. Cynthia Estlund, Rethinking Autocracy at Work, 131 HARV. L. REV. 795 (2018).
149. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 6.
150. Id. at 55.
151. Among the findings and policies of the NLRA are that “[t]he inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association . . . tends to
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry” and that the policy of promoting commerce will be served “by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018).
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dignity of freedom and self-expression in their daily lives . . . will never bow to
tyranny in any quarter of their national life.”152
Labor unions institutionalized what Anderson identifies as the four essential
ways to protect “the liberties and interests of the governed under any type of
government.”153 These are: (1) an effective use of the threat of exit, as by striking
or enabling workers to leave a job without being blacklisted or unemployed, (2)
the rule of law, effective enforcement of contractual and statutory rights to
minimum standards and fair treatment, (3) substantive constitutional rights,
rights at work, and (4) voice, a say in working conditions.154 The decline of unions
has contributed to a democracy deficit at work and in politics.155
Our research on governance within worker centers suggests these
organizations strive to fill that deficit in the workplace, in communities, and
through local, state, and national political mobilization by building individual and
collective worker voice in a bottom-up way that is responsive to the lived
experience of workers. Unlike unions—which are required by law to operate
internally as electoral democracies—worker centers embrace internal democracy
as a matter of fundamental commitment, and as a strategy to build worker power.
As Jennifer and Paula said, internal democracy is “not inherent in the 501(c)(3)
structure” of nonprofits unlike “the structure of a union [that] kind of inherently
encourages sort of democracy because workers vote for the leadership.” They
continued: “I bet if you look at non-profit both across the board, most of the
boards have connections to funders or fundraising capabilities. . . . I would say
probably a minority have representation from the base, for example.” Robert
said, “all in all we basically have like a traditional nonprofit structure, and don’t
have a lot of real clear accountability from the workers.”
Many leaders recognized that keeping workers involved in governance or
internal decision-making presents continual challenges as worker centers grow in
size. As Jennifer and Paula said:
[T]here’s a lot of learning, a lot of experimentation on how to use these different
structures in order to achieve transparency and democracy, and leadership,
accountability. And I think we’re all trying to figure it out and it’s really just a process,
but I wouldn’t say that we have it figured out completely.

They continued, in answering a question about processes for democracy in
organizational governance:
In some ways all the questions that you’re asking us today, we might have different
answers in a few years. [laughter] I think there are certain things we are gonna wanna
keep still central around transparency, around interdependence, around care. And they
will change in nature and implementation as we get bigger.

152. JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
1947-1994 1 (1995). Another source Professor Gross quotes for this proposition is U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR
AND U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Dec. 1994).
153. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 65.
154. Id. at 66–70.
155. ROSENFELD, supra note 13.
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Hanna echoed the same concern: “[A]s the domestic worker movement grows,
there’s also new domestic worker organizations popping up…all across the State
of California, so an emergent question for us is, how do we provide inroads for
these non-steering committee-level domestic worker groups, and at what level?”
Member involvement in a large organization is an equally significant
challenge. Hanna explained:
So I think a task that we’re trying to figure out is, how do we provide different layers of
engagement, and the ability to weigh in on the strategic direction of our work, and to be
involved in the work of the coalition at a deeper level. . . . We’ve experimented with . .
. these mass base membership drives, where we’ve reached thousands of workers
through outreach. I think a challenge compared to unions is definitely how you integrate
them when you don’t have a collective bargaining agreement. When you’re not plugging
them into a specific membership that directly. . . . Yeah, I don’t know, I just think it’s a
challenge to capture them as members when you’re not actually signing people up on a
card. . . . I think our current infrastructure would have to shift, to be honest, in order to
grow to scale.”

The challenge of involving workers in the activities of the organization is
compounded by the fact that many of the workers whom worker centers are
organizing do not have a common workplace. Day laborers, domestic workers,
and even many restaurant workers, work alone or with a relatively small number
of people. High turnover can make it difficult to form an organization even where
workers have a common worksite, as in fast food. Several solutions are being
explored.
One is preserving the smallness of any particular organization but connecting
them regionally through affiliations. Hanna mused:
I think all organizations are thinking about how they grow to scale in their region, and
then people look to the coalition to be how we grow to scale in a different way. We grow
to scale throughout the state, through different ethnic communities, Filipino, and
Chinese, and Latina . . . workers in different regions, and then really prioritize having
an authentic decision-making structure at the center of the statewide work. And that’s
how we kind of grow to scale. I don’t know if that makes sense. Versus a union model
which may open new chapters, and a new shop, or in a new region. I think people wanna
grow to scale within where they work, in the city of Los Angeles . . . .

Hanna continued:
Each of us has an obligation to think about how we grow to scale in our region, and in
our ethnic community, ‘cause most . . . organizing [in this sector] happens ethnically
specific, but they look towards the coalition and [national association of worker centers]
as the way to grow to scale.

Other leaders suggested that technology may be the way that organizations can
grow to scale. Marianne said:
[W]hat does democracy look like? What does governance look like when you aggregate
workers who are essentially disaggregated? Is a physical meeting space the only way in
which to engage, connect, and organize workers? Is the door knocking what we
traditionally know the basis on which to build a membership?

Perhaps, she suggested, the question is “how do we then harness technology
to advance . . . in a positive way of bringing democracy?” Marianne said that
“[h]aving a brick and mortar worker center that workers go to” may not be
necessary, suggesting an analogy to another worker organization:
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OUR Walmart is an interesting formation where they’re trying to organize [chuckle]
the employees of the largest private employer in the world. And they have other
challenges [chuckle] other than just democracy, well, democracy in the sort of unequal
power dynamics between the employer and the workers. But what I’ve heard them talk
about is that Facebook actually has been an amazing way to connect and reach workers,
because many of the Walmart associates are online and are finding each other through
Facebook. And so through that, they’re able to create connections, community, at a
local and regional level. And it is the job of the full-time staff of these organizations to,
how do you harness that energy and making sure you don’t do a top-down kind of
approach, and how do you actually create a space for workers who are finding each
other through online to really voice and raise their concerns and the direction of the
organization?

But without workers together in a physical space, she said, “how do you make
the connection?”
Another aspect of the worker center movement and its impact on social and
political democracy is the racial and gender character of most of the organizations
in the field. Women of color lead and staff many of the worker centers examined
in this study. As described above in Part III.C.6., the identity of leadership, staff,
and workers significantly shape organizations, how much they focus on individual
member transformation, and what kinds of demands they make. Ocasio &
Gertner highlight the “intersectional demands” of the new worker organizations
at the juncture of labor, civil rights, and immigration.156 Worker centers are
channeling “material and social resources in ways that are at odds with dominant
schemas, potentially altering racial structures.”157 This is a challenge to the
whiteness of incumbent civil society institutions158 and to the whiteness of
American citizenship and democracy itself.159 Notwithstanding the mixed
identities of leadership, staff, and members, many of our civil society institutions
successfully resist diversity and inclusion initiatives. Worker centers have leaders,
staff, and members of color but also advance anti-racist and anti-sexist
intersectional demands that are core to their existence.
Finally, worker centers challenge authority—both who holds it and why they
hold it—analogous to the “prefigurative” organizations examined by Polletta:
Activists in many of the organizations that I studied sought to create new kinds of
legitimate power. Their experimentalism was partly borne of necessity: with few models
of collectivist decision-making, they were forced to invent new ones. But it also reflected
a view that the decisions that affected people’s lives had been made only by the
“qualified”—the credentialed, the moneyed, the powerful.160

In their attempts to engage in the development of “the political” in members,
worker centers effectively mount a critique of expertise as it is currently defined.
“[A]ctivists . . . use their organizations to experiment with mechanisms of citizen

156. Ocasio & Gertner, supra note1.
157. Victor Ray, A Theory of Racialized Organizations, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 26, 43 (2019).
158. Cheryl Harris, citing W.E.B. Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction, notes the convergence of “white”
and “worker,” a convergence that persists in American social and political discourse to this day. Cheryl
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1741–42 (1993).
159. Id. at 1742 (“Whiteness was also central to national identity and to the republican project.”).
160. POLLETTA, supra note 15, at 8.
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input.”161 They seek to democratize sources of authority and overturn the racial
and gender hierarchies that are resilient and resurgent in the American polity.
E. Legal Regulation and Funding Models
As noted briefly above, the law regulates labor unions quite differently than
it regulates other membership-based not-for-profit organizations. In particular,
the LMRDA requires a level of internal democracy and transparency to
members about governance and finance that the law of nonprofit corporations
and tax exemption does not require of § 501(c)(3) organizations.162 A sympathetic
account of the purposes of the LMRDA would attribute the legal requirement of
internal democracy to the importance of ensuring worker organizations are
accountable to their members.
Our findings suggest that worker centers embrace a deep commitment to
internal democracy but have adopted a variety of mechanisms to ensure it. To
the extent that there is a concern about whether workers would benefit if worker
centers were subject to the LMRDA, our findings suggest there is not yet a
problem with accountability and worker engagement in governance and,
therefore, legal regulation is unnecessary to protect workers from oligarchy.
Governance structures—by which we mean mainly the organization’s
practices and bylaws, but which also could include regulation imposed either by
law (LMRDA) or by foundation funding agreements—should have an organic
relation to the organization’s goals. In the case of unions and worker centers,
therefore, the governance should reflect the organization’s and its members’
theory of social change. Our findings, therefore, may be the normative basis for
an argument that courts and agencies should reject legal efforts to regulate
worker organizations in the name of member or nonmember protection (as in the
case of union dues objectors) or to subject worker centers to the LMRDA
reporting and disclosure requirements and Taft-Hartley restrictions on funding
sources.163
161. Id. at 11.
162. The LMRDA requires local unions to conduct secret ballot elections of officers, at which all
members in good standing are eligible to vote, not less often than once every three years. 29 U.S.C.
481(b). National or international labor organizations must conduct such elections no less often than once
every five years, and intermediate bodies once every four years. 29 U.S.C. 481(a). The union must not
discriminate in distributing candidate materials for such elections, must allow all members in good
standing, subject to reasonable qualifications, to run for election and allow candidates to have an observer
at the polls and to inspect the lists of eligible voters. 29 U.S.C. 481(c). State nonprofit corporation law
does not impose similar requirements of internal democracy. See sources cited supra note 76.
163. If the Department of Labor were to change longstanding law and to deem worker centers to be
“labor organizations” under the LMRDA and LMRA, this new legal rule would presumably prohibit
worker centers from receiving money or “any thing of value” from an employer. This would, if
implemented, prohibit all sorts of innovative funding mechanisms, such as those used by ROC, the
Coalition of Immokalee Workers, and so forth. This is perhaps why the Federalist Society has taken an
interest in asserting that worker centers are subject to the LMRDA. See Stefan J. Marculewicz & Jennifer
Thomas, Labor Organizations By Another Name: The Worker Center Movement and Its Evolution Into
Coverage Under the NLRA and LMRDA, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 79 (2012)
(arguing that worker centers are subject to the LMRDA and NLRA).

